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Zackary Thomas Slykhouse 
From the Steppe to Astana: The Development of Kazakh Nationalism 
Nationalist ideologies are a strong political and social force based on the principle of one 
sovereign nation’s rights over a given national territory.  These ideas may seem simple, but the 
arguments, symbol-making and historical revisionism inherent in such a matter need strong 
elaboration, active nation-building efforts, and are prone to interruption by transformative crises. 
Kazakh nationalism is no exception to this rule.  This paper shows the origins, competing nation-
building efforts and the major transformative crises within this now one hundred-and-thirteen-
year long tradition.  In this paper I argue, following the theories of Miroslav Hroch, that  Kazakh 
nationalism 1) begins in Orenburg periodicals under the Horde of Alash, 2) expands to the status 
of a mass national movement via Soviet nation-building and by reactions to that process under 
the tenure of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, 3) is greatly transformed during the 1986 Jeltoksan riots 
in Alma-Ata, which engendered a hard cleft between Kazakh national activists and the USSR 
center, and 4) is a common feature of Kazakhstani politics in the post-independence period, used 
when and where the narrative supports state projects or state legitimacy. Taken as a whole, we 
see a tradition built to be national in form but Soviet in character then realized as Soviet in form 
but national in character. Thus, this work serves as a guide to the major elaborations, 
transformations, and conjurations of Kazakh Nationalism through history by synthesizing the 
works of many scholars of Kazakh national movements, historians, and various primary sources 
of national character. 
 
v 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Front Matter 
Title Page, i 
Committee Signatures, ii 
Acknowledgements, iii 
Abstract, iv 
 
From the Steppe to Astana: 
 The Creation, Reclamation and Elaboration of Kazakh Nationalism 
 
Text 
Introduction, 1-17 
Theoretical Considerations, 5-11 
Literature Review, 12-17 
Section 1: The Horde of Alash’s Phase A & B, and the Imperial-era Transformative Crisis, 18-33 
Section 2:  Crises and Kunayev, The Results of Soviet-Kazakh Nation-Building, 34-44 
Section 3: The Second Transformational Crisis:  The 1986 Jeltoksan Riots, 45-53 
Section 4: The Transitional Crisis of Independence, the “Kazakhstani” identity, and the Mapping of 
Modern Kazakh Nationalism 54-69 
Conclusion, 70 
 
Supplemental 
Bibliography, 71-73 
Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
 1  
 
On December 16, 1991, the world’s largest landlocked country, Kazakhstan declared 
itself an independent nation, the last of the soviet republics to leave the USSR.  Of all the 
theoretical territorial, political and social crises that might have caused general strife, territorial 
annexation, or ethnic conflict- none occurred.  Nor did a supra-national organization, such as an 
alternative to the USSR come into place.  In these early days of independence, Kazakhstan did 
not conflagrate into ethnic civil war as its contemporaries Tajikistan or Yugoslavia did.  Despite 
a series of economic collapses, international financial scandals, and the early years of runaway 
inflation, the Republic of Kazakhstan remains to this day, and Nursultan Nazarbayev is still 
President.  As Kazakhstan celebrates 27 years of independence, and questions of succession 
remain, it becomes more critical to understand holistically the social and political forces which 
sustain both nation and state, and those which threaten future stability.  A key item in both of 
these categories, is Kazakh nationalism. 
In 2014, a notable debate erupted over on whether to change the name of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan to Kazakh Yeli [Қазақ Елі]: a change away from the norm of post-soviet Central 
Asian Republics.1  In the Kazakh language this phrase is more akin to “Country of the Kazakhs”, 
and Yel can be used with many nations, but Kazakh Yeli was initially conceived by Kazakh 
intellectuals within the Horde of Alash [Алаш Ордасы], a nationalist movement nearly 100 
years earlier, and therefore has a secondary, deeply nationalist context.  This phrase was used, in 
conjunction with novel phrases like Atameken [Атамекен] (fatherland) and Atajurt [Атажұрт] 
(motherland) to articulate ideas of a Kazakh national and primordial homeland.2  In 2014, 
applying a Kazakh language word to the name of the country was, in and of itself, regarded as a 
                                                          
1 Alexander C. Diener   "Imagining Kazakhstani-stan: Negotiations of Homeland and Titular Nationality" 131 
2 Steven Sabol. Russian Colonization and Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness. 26 
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Kazakh nationalist movement by the many other ethnic groups of the predominately Russian-
speaking country.   The 2014 Kazakh Yeli initiative, proposed by Nazarbayev and supported by 
many national-patriot organizations, was defeated.3 For observers of Kazakh politics, however, 
this conflict functions as an important signifier of modern relationships between Kazakhstan’s 
autocratic government, Kazakh nationalist groups, and the realities of being a multiethnic, 
multicultural state. 
The government of Kazakhstan claims legitimacy both through Kazakh nationalism (the 
belief in ethnic Kazakh sovereignty over a primordial Kazakh homeland), and multiethnic civic 
nationalism - the belief in fair representation of all ethnicities within a state, and a guarantee of 
welfare and representation of those ethnicities.  In this way, the state co-opts support from (or at 
the very least, attempts to co-opt support from) the entire population.  It is a peculiar system, 
kept in constant tension as demographics continue to shift and change.  Ethnic Kazakhs are 
primus inter pares within state discourse, having a noted state-making, peace-keeping 
responsibility.4  The Kazakh ethnic group, once an ethnonymic plurality at the time of 
independence, is now a thin demographic majority.  This is partially a result of the exodus of 
over 2 million Russians since 1991, the Kazakh repatriation from other states (the Oralman 
program) and a high Kazakh birthrate.5  Kazakhstan is also a richly multi-cultural and 
multiethnic state, with over 100 different ethnic groups represented within the Assembly of the 
People of Kazakhstan.6  It would be impossible for Kazakhstan to have a government, similar to 
say Latvia, wherein a popular monoethnic nationalistic hegemony is translated into a potent 
                                                          
3 Marlene Laruelle,  "Which Future for National-Patriots?  The Landscape of Kazakh Nationalism" 167 
4 Marlene Laruelle,  "Which Future for National-Patriots?  The Landscape of Kazakh Nationalism" 155 
5 Marth Brill Olcott, The Kazakhs 52 
6 Malika Orazgaliyeva. "Assembly of People of Kazakhstan Seeks to Strengthen Interethnic Harmony." 
https://astanatimes.com/2015/04/assembly-of-people-of-kazakhstan-seeks-to-strengthen-interethnic-harmony/. 
 3  
 
political platform.7  As Nazarbayev himself has said, “God Grant that no one should stir up 
Kazakhstan on ethnic grounds; [sic] it would be far worse than Yugoslavia!”8 
Kazakh nationalism is instrumental to state legitimacy.  It co-opts popular Kazakh 
support, while granting and elaborating a state history.  The homeland narrative also provides 
international legitimacy, as ethnic Kazakhs from China to Mongolia seek repatriation.  At the 
same time, Kazakh nationalism is the language used by national extremist parties, who critique 
the government’s reforms, stage protests, and threaten the future stability of the country.  It is 
thus possible for many Kazakhs to feel owed the idealized ethnic homeland elaborated in state 
discourse, but never given.  In areas such as the recovery and primacy of the Kazakh language, 
the government has made promises since 1991, yet has not delivered the economic, legal, or 
human capital for such a national transformation to occur.9  
In any cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic civilization, the action of extreme nationalist politics 
can breed irrational behaviors, fascism, and creation of tiered citizenship systems based upon 
national ethnicity.  When one segment of the population is mobilized, it can be mobilized against 
other groups, leading to security issues or ethnic strife in the worst of situations.  Miroslav Hroch 
writes that a true nationalist is “one who gives absolute priority to the values of the nation over 
all other values and interests.”10  In his study of European nation-building efforts, Hroch finds 
that “in conditions of acute stress, people characteristically tend to over-value the protective 
comfort of their own national group.”11  Kazakhstan is not immune to strife, having many years 
                                                          
7 See: Diana Kudaibergenova, "Nationalizing Elites and Regimes:  Nation-building in Post-Soviet Authoritarian and 
Democratic Contexts” 
8 Alexander C. Diener   "Imagining Kazakhstani-stan: Negotiations of Homeland and Titular Nationality" 131 
9 Laruelle, “Which Future for National Patriots?.” 161 
10 Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to Fully-formed Nation:  The Nation-building Process in Europe” 62 
11 Hroch, 71 
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of economic issues- namely inflation- with which to contend.  Yet the state still, in many ways, 
promotes the agenda of Kazakh national groups. State symbols, from the flag to the national 
anthem are all based on Kazakh culture, and have a meaning rarely translated into Russian.12  It 
is further clear that Kazakhstan will always treat the Kazakh ethnicity with greater privilege.  As 
President Nazarbayev has declared, “A nation cannot exist without a state, it vanishes, it is 
appropriate if in some cases the interests of the indigenous nation, the Kazakhs are given special 
emphasis in this state.”13  He leaves observers to wonder: if Kazakhstanis are put under broad 
social and economic stress, what will happen between Kazakhs and the many other ethnic groups 
within the state? 
Little occurs in a vacuum, and the nationalistic ideas of a sovereign Kazakh-ruled 
territory over the land of the Kazakh SSR did not merely appear when convenient in 1991. Hroch 
writes (after his broad survey of national movements within Europe, for the broad majority of 
nationalisms) that there is a period of intellectual elaboration, followed by a a period of political 
agitation, and a final ‘awakening’ of a nationalistic consciousness in a broad segment of the 
target demographic.14  To understand the modern realities of Kazakh Nationalism, we need to 
appreciate how its foundational ideas were conceived, how they changed over time, and how 
they were reiterated by the subsequent generations.  We need to understand its initial genesis, the 
key figures and operators of its elaboration, the actions of those who continued to elaborate it, 
and the key incidents and actors in Kazakhstan’s history which broadened public understanding 
and appeal.  This document attempts to answer the question: “What do we talk about when we 
                                                          
12 Martha Brill Olcott. Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise? 59 
13 Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise? 31 
14 Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to Fully-formed Nation:  The Nation-building Process in Europe” 62 
 5  
 
talk about Kazakh Nationalism?,” by providing a social-political-historical framework which 
maps Kazakh nationalism at the time of its genesis within the Horde of Alash [Алаш Ордасы] 
movement, through Soviet history to independence, and to the modern era.  It pays special 
attention to the national importance of the 1986 Jeltoksan (December) [желтоқсан] Riots.   
Theoretical Considerations 
As Alexander Maxwell writes, the scholarly literature on nationalism is “unsurveyably 
vast.”15  Defining “Nationalism” is one of the hardest and most contentious issues within current 
scholarship.  One possible definition: a political, social and economic movement characterized 
by the interests of a particular group of people who define themselves as a nation, usually with 
the goal of national self-governance over a national homeland, supported by the creation of a 
national identity.  Yet, if a group only advocates independence, or only creates documents to 
support a national identity, are they inherently nationalist?  When a nationalist sleeps, is he still a 
nationalist?  Can nationalist works, upon being revived in a future where the nationalist 
imperatives have largely been lost or changed, still be considered nationalist?  Are there good or 
bad nationalisms?  Is ethnic pride inherently nationalist?  Extensive taxonomies of differing 
kinds of nationalism have been written, though, in the opinion of the author, these tend to be as 
flawed and contentious as they are helpful.  Even Anthony D. Smith’s thirty-nine-fold taxonomy 
of nationalism comes with the caveat that any given case of a nationalism probably fits under 
multiple taxonomic headings as a result of sheer complexity.16 
                                                          
15 Alexander Maxwell "Typologies and phases in nationalism studies: Hroch's A-B-C schema as a basis for 
comparative terminology." 865 
16 Maxwell, 866 
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Because of this ongoing intellectual debate among scholars of nationalism and nations, 
we need to articulate our working definitions of “nation” and “nationalism” as it pertains to this 
project, and to identify where, in this broader debate, our definitions lie.  It would be impossible, 
or at least theoretically unsound, to model Kazakh nationalism without undertaking this effort.  
At the barest level, we are in conceptual agreement with Ernest Renan; that a nation is a form of 
spirit, rather than a discrete object.  It is something understood, but not necessarily wholly 
articulate.  An element of popular simplification of complex ideas and systems is thus crucial, as 
Ernst Gellner recognizes, “Nationalism revolves around attempts to convert the intrinsically 
ambiguous and controversial into the conventional and seemingly natural, imposing a normalized 
order on a much more complex cultural community.”17  Expanding on this, Harun Yilmaz 
describes Nationalism as a “fundamentally romantic narrative,” a story which answers the 
common questions: “who were our ancestors?,” “What were their borders?,”  “Who are our 
leading figures?,”  “Who are our historical enemies?,”  “How were we reborn into modernity?”18  
These narratives determine what popular national history is and “what is not history.”19  For the 
nation, the intended audience of this narrative, it answers loudly the key questions of, “Who are 
we?”  and “Who were we?”.  For the purposes of this document we define nationalism as a 
politically influential and instrumental narrative which advocates for higher degrees of 
sovereignty, promotes the nation, reinforces cultural attributes, and creates easily understandable 
hierarchies of values within history, politics, and society.   
                                                          
17 Diana Kudaibergenova, "Nationalizing Elites and Regimes:  Nation-building in Post-Soviet Authoritarian and 
Democratic Contexts" 119 
18 Harun Yilmaz. National Identities in Soviet Historiography: The Rise of Nations under Stalin. 4 
19 Diana Kudaibergenova Rewriting the Nation in Modern Kazakh Literature: Elites and Narratives. 15 
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With regards to this work’s working definition of nation and nationalism, Miroslav Hroch 
posits the following:  The nation is a group of people who together (or at least in a large core 
constituency) hold (i) a memory of a common past, and a belief in a common group destiny, (ii) 
a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication and 
expression within the core group, (iii) conception of equality of all members of the group when 
civilly organized.20  Core to his argument is the concept that nations are not primordial, though 
the connections which allow nations to organize tend to be based on common histories and 
traditions.  A people is not automatically a nation- by Hroch’s definition, they need to elaborate 
and communicate ideas of their distinctiveness, connectiveness and community, a process either 
separate, political and distinct, or less distinct within other cultural and social processes called 
‘nation-building.’21  Both the academic and literary elaboration of ideals and the action of 
articulating a ‘nationalism’ to its target population, will be our “nation-building”.  The term 
national consciousness will also be used when describing salient and powerful ideas within 
Kazakh nationalism at various historical points of development.   
Kazakh Nationalism never was, and is not a discrete, monolithic, permanent set of values 
and principles which have been unanimously upheld in the national consciousness by all 
Kazakhs through all time.  There are areas of the narrative that are quite popular, and areas 
which never have been.  There are greatly elaborated ideas, and ideas held in contention.  These 
formations shift and change with each new author, new activist, new crises and new generation 
of Kazakh nationalists.  As Hroch writes, three types of crisis can bring about a sudden necessity 
for nation-building, as well as a transformation of a given nationalism.  These are:  1) a social or 
                                                          
20 Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to Fully-formed Nation:  The Nation-building Process in Europe” 62 
21 Hroch, 60 
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political crisis of the existing order, accompanied by new tensions or new destinies, 2) an 
emergence of significant discontent across large parts of the population, and/or 3) a potent loss of 
faith in traditional or current religious or moral systems.22  Such transformative crises are 
historically visible in the actions of the Horde of Alash at the time of the Russian Civil War, in 
the years of the Kazakh SSR up to the 1986 Almaty protests, and through the transition from 
post-independence to modern Kazakhstan, and will be detailed extensively in their respective 
sections below.  Each of these moments ‘built’ the Kazakh nation and Kazakh nationalism 
through the elaboration, politicization, and greater salience of a Kazakh nationalist ideology, as 
Kazakh individuals sought to use the nation as a rallying point to converse about and resolve 
various critical issues. 
Despite these transformative crises, it would be incorrect to assume that all qualities of 
Kazakh nationalism altered throughout history.  Though there are large transformations, there is 
a connective through-line between each major transformation.  In a time of crisis, intellectuals 
often look to the past.  As Hroch writes, “more generally, the legacy of… [prior] …nation-
building processes, even if failed or abated, often left significant resources for the [latter].”23 For 
example, simply because the Horde of Alash failed to produce a successful, independent Kazakh 
nation-state does not mean the memory of the attempt and the crisis which precipitated it 
vanished from the national consciousness or the Kazakh national narrative.  As memories of 
battles reiterate the nature of ancestral enemies, and the concept of a national identity, so too do 
lands held by previous national polities.  Thus the memory of the Horde of Alash as a Kazakh 
                                                          
22 Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to Fully-formed Nation:  The Nation-building Process in Europe”  
66-67 
23 Hroch, 65 
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ethnic polity is a strong nationalizing force, despite the actual nature of its scope or potency.   
Further still, unless the written materials used to convey and elaborate the nationalism at that 
time are to their fullest extent totally lost, (which in our case never happened, not even to the 
Horde of Alash) those materials are, and will continue to be, an potent part of nation-building, 
and a component of the overall nationalism-narrative.24 
Miroslav Hroch’s three chronological phases in the creation of a nation, a three phase A -
> B -> C theoretical framework of nationalism lend a strong, if greatly simplified framework for 
understanding Kazakh nationalism through a historical lens.25  In Phase A, nationalist 
movements are first elaborated by intelligentsia and national-activists striving for a national 
identity.  The foundation of this effort is in historical, linguistic, ethnogenetic and cultural 
research.  Such groups usually focus on the development of a national culture based on a local 
language, and the role of that language in education, political administration, and economic 
life.26   Phase A can be undertaken with an imperative for political sovereignty, but that is not a 
requirement of this early stage.  Phase A can also occur with or without great, purposeful 
nationalistic organization or imperatives.  In Phase B, a new group/order of activists attempt to 
popularize the ideas articulated in Phase A among co-ethnics attempting to “patriotically agitate” 
or “awaken” a national consciousness, calling the population to action on some topic, usually 
national independence.  Such attempts can succeed or fail.  Finally in Phase C, a mass national 
movement occurs, wherein a major part of the population is mobilized, and identify themselves 
                                                          
24 For the historic treatment of Alash and its publications under the Soviets, see: Amanzhalova, Kazakhskiĭ 
Avtonomizm i Rossii͡ a: Istorii͡ a Dvizhenii͡ a Alash 
25For a lengthy interrogation of Hroch’s A-B-C theory and it’s reception in academic literature, I recommend.  
Alexander Maxwell "Typologies and phases in nationalism studies: Hroch's A-B-C schema as a basis for 
comparative terminology." 865-880 
26 Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to Fully-formed Nation:  The Nation-building Process in Europe”  62 
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as members of the nation.  At the end of phase C, national actors are present in every branch of 
society and every ideological camp must react to it.  Phase C does not have to be a singular 
movement by a single organization, nor must the nationalistic ideas, or even the actors of Phase 
A and B need to survive, rather Phase C is a realization of the movement, and broad reactions to 
it.  To greatly simplify this, nations and nationalisms are first elaborated by intellectual elite, 
moved by national provocateurs, and then broadly recognized in a “We are this nation, we are 
owed X, we demand Y” type social and political movement. 
This is not the first work to apply Miroslav Hroch’s three phases to the subject of Kazakh 
nationalism.  Steven Sabol, in his book Russian Colonization and Genesis of Kazakh National 
Consciousness does so directly.  In his work, Sabol argues that the Horde of Alash intellectuals 
were beginning a Phase A to Phase B transition when the 1917 Russian Revolution forced the 
movement into a haphazard Phase C (the creation of the independent government), which was 
co-opted by the Soviets and their creation of the Kazakh SSR.27 
Steven Sabol’s framework seems problematic as it infers that there is a natural 
continuation of actors and ideas between the Horde of Alash movement, and the Soviet 
development of the Kazakh SSR.   In fact, The Horde of Alash government was disbanded by the 
Red Army in 1920, and both the scholarly actors and political leaders were arrested, largely 
purged (shot in the head) as dangerous, “bourgeoise nationalists” in 1928.28  Attempts to write 
the history of the Horde of Alash were then greatly handicapped at every turn.  From the first 
comprehensive study by A.K. Bochagovim in 1927, which attempted to understand Alash as a 
national movement, to the works of T. Toghzhanov in 1932, which attempted to paint Alash as a 
                                                          
27 Steven Sabol. Russian Colonization and Genesis of Kazak National Consciousness. 4-5 
28 Amanzhalova, Kazakhskiĭ Avtonomizm i Rossii͡ a: Istorii͡ a Dvizhenii͡ a Alash pg. 6, translated by Z. Slykhouse 
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“fully reactionary” movement- all were gravely censored.29 Stalin’s directives on what Soviet 
history was to be, turned out to be ruinous for the study of Alash; by 1935, it had become the 
normative standard to discuss Alash without referencing a single primary source, or even 
compilations of primary or secondary sources.  Writers and historians would base argumentation 
upon previously approved definitions and essays which elaborated a ‘proper’ theory which 
followed the party line.  Amanzhalova, through her surveys of archival sources, discovered that 
although many primary sources of Alash survived, such as issues of the newspapers “Kazakh” 
and “Ai Qap,” as well as records of their initial congresses, such documents were left unsourced 
in archives for most of Soviet history-making.30 A resurrection and widespread reprinting of 
Alash documents began in 1982, but since, for the most part of the history the Kazakh SSR, 
Alash and its documents were strictly controlled through academic censure, it is best to segregate 
and identify Alash as a different movement from the development of the Kyrgyz ASR or Kazakh 
SSR.  Thus, it is hard to say this enforced cauterization of Alash was a “co-optation”. 
The Soviets conducted their own Kazakh nation-building process.  The Leninist 
nationalities policy and Soviet ethnographical research were  critical components of Kazakh 
nation-building.  This must not be conflated with the nation-building undertaken by the Horde of 
Alash as the Soviet construction of a Soviet-Kazakh nation, in tandem with the state-building 
projects of the KASR/KSSR, were undertaken by different actors (initially largely non-Kazakh 
actors), for differing purposes, and differing end goals.  Kazakh nationalism is hence developed 
and articulated by two parallel, and oft-competing nation-building processes, one which begins 
with native Kazakhs in the Horde of Alash at the start of the 20th century, and one which begins 
                                                          
29 Amanzhalova, 6-7 
30 Amanzhalova, 13 
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with the collapse and Soviet censure of the Horde of Alash, and which is initially articulated by 
non-Kazakhs.  The Kazakh nationalism of today is a mixture of these two nationalizing forces. 
Literature Review 
Our sources include histories of Kazakhstan, which help give historical context for 
various national developments and crises, the work of other scholars of Kazakh nationalism who 
have mapped developments in Kazakh history and literature from Alash to the modern era, and 
who are supported theoretically by scholars of nationalism and state legitimacy.  There is another 
category, that of Kazakhstani state media, and oppositional media which can provide an 
additional context for the current national landscape.  Such works are inherently biased, but their 
bias is used to make analytical points rather than to support an argument as fact.   
 Our historical background mainly originates in broad histories written by Shirin Akiner 
(The Formation of Kazakh Identity:  From Tribe to Nation-State), and by Martha Brill Olcott 
(The Kazakhs and Kazakhstan:  Unfulfilled Promise).  Dr. Akiner is a research associate at 
London University’s School of Oriental and African Studies.  She faced some censure roughly 
twelve years ago for her work Violence in Andijan, which was criticized for being biased and 
propagandist towards the Islam Karimov administration.  However, The Formation of Kazakh 
Identity was published a full twelve years prior to this controversy, and does not appear to be a 
work of biased history.  Dr. Martha Brill Olcott is now retired, a professor emerita at Colgate 
University.  Her work The Kazakhs was foundational for a time, and Kazakhstan:  Unfulfilled 
Promise? may be seen as an extension of that work.  Many raw facts and points of argumentation 
from both authors will be supporting our argumentation throughout this thesis.  
 13  
 
 That is not to say this work relies only on these comprehensive works of history.  As we 
move through specific frames of time, we will rely more on scholarship written about those time-
frames by historians and scholars of Kazakh nationalism within the period.   
Starting with the Horde of Alash (Early 20th Century), we utilize the work of Dr. Dina 
Akhmetzhanova Amanzhalova (Kazakhskiĭ Avtonomizm i Rossii͡ a: Istorii͡ a Dvizhenii͡ a Alash ( 
Kazakh Autonomism:  The History of the Alash Movement), Dr.  Adeeb Khalid (Making 
Uzbekistan:  Nation, Empire and Revolution in the Early USSR), Dr. Steven Sabol (Russian 
Colonization and Genesis of Kazakh National Consciousness), and Dr.  Harun Yilmaz (National 
Identities in Soviety Historiography:  The Rise of Nations under Stalin).  Dr. Amanzhalova was a 
professor at the Semipalatinisk Pedagogical Institute, and her work focuses on how various 
Soviet authors have attempted to write comprehensive histories of the Horde of Alash within a 
fairly toxic scholastic environment, defining precisely how the KSSR tried to remember the 
movement, as well as how Alash was be recovered in the 1980s.   Dr. Sabol, professor at the 
University of North Carolina, continues to study history and national movements within the post-
Soviet Space.  His work, a history of Alash, is the first to use Miroslav Hroch’s A-B-C schema 
of national agitation, and thereby is both historically and argumentatively useful in that regard.  
Dr. Harun Yilmaz, currently a research fellow at Queen Mary University of London earned his 
doctorate at the University of Oxford.  His work is an extremely useful reference for historical 
Soviet state- and nation-building projects under Lenin and Stalin.  Dr.  Adeeb Khalid, a professor 
at Carleton College, writes about the transition between Turkestan to the modern nations of 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  By and large, Khalid’s work has little to 
do with the Horde of Alash, but reactions between Turkestani leaders and Alash leaders are 
explored within. 
 14  
 
For the broader “Phase B agitation” section of this thesis, which documents efforts of 
both Kazakh and Soviet-Kazakh nationalists in the period between 1930 and 1986, we also rely 
on a plethora of supporting works.  Harun Yilmaz’s aforementioned text The Rise of Nations 
Under Stalin is useful in the earlier areas of this period.  Dr. Diana Kudaibergenova, a 
postdoctoral researcher at the Lund University of Law, brings us Rewriting the Nation in Modern 
Kazakh Literature:  Elites and Narratives, which shows the actions of Kazakh nationalist authors 
within a period starting in the 1950’s to the modern era.  Critical to this task are the works of Dr.  
Michael G. Stefany, an Assistant Professor at Penn State University, who is a nearly unparalleled 
scholar of the 1986 Jeltoksan riots, given his variety of archival sources from multiple factions 
and personal interviews with subjects on many sides of the ordeal, from managers of the security 
response, to retired security officers, to witnesses and demonstrators of the ordeal.  It is hard to 
find accounts of Jeltoksan which are given without gross politicization of the event, that is: 
without a bias toward proving a ‘correct’ interpretation history, without assigning blame, or 
without a usage of facts considered politicized by other sides.  Even works by the supposedly 
neutral Shokhanov Commission or the laborious interrogation of archival materials by the 
Kazakh scholar Makmud Kozybayev tend to have strong bias.  In Ethnic Battleground:  The 
December 1986 Alma-Ata Events and the Developing Kazakh Idea, Stefany puts forward 
information from three different sides, and takes no side of his own, trying to explain how this 
division in interpretations occurred rather than proving one side’s veracity above others or 
showing one side as a victim.  In his Kazakhization, Kunaev, and Kazakhstan:  A Bridge to 
Independence, Stefany explores how differing interpretations of the Kazakh nation took on a 
center versus periphery and a Kazakh versus Russian orientation, and how the actions of 
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glasnost’ and perestroika actually led to ethnic conflict, as well as a re-ignition of Kazakh 
nation-building across the KSSR.   
For the Soviet period after 1986, through independence and into the modern day, we rely 
on a variety of sources. The influence of Soviet-Kazakh nationalists has greatly waned, and the 
young state itself needs to wrestle with the creation of its own national symbols and national 
history.  Stability is perhaps one of the largest questions given to all the young states of Central 
Asia, and therefore, we also include the work of many scholars focused on the intersection 
between Kazakh nationalism, the Kazakh state, Kazakhstani society and the political math of 
legitimacy.  Such authors include Dr Alexander C. Diener (“Imagining Kazakhstani-stan”), 
Researchers Eva-Marie Dubuisson and Ana Genina (“Claiming an Ancestral Homeland:  Kazakh 
Pilgrimage and Migration in Inner Asia.”), Dr. Diana Kudaibergenova (the aforementioned 
Rewriting the Nation and “Nationalizing Elites and Regimes: Nation-building in Post-Soviet 
Authoritarian and Democratic Contexts”), Dr. Marlene Laruelle (Kazakhstan in the Making:  
Legitimacy, Symbols and Social Changes), Dr. Sebastien Peyrouse (“The Kazakh 
Neopatrimonial Regime: Balancing Uncertainties…”), and Dr. Assel Tutumlu (“The Rule by 
Law:  Negotiating Stability in Kazakhstan..”).     Diener is an Associate Professor of Geography 
at the University of Kansas.  In his article he writes about ongoing Kazakh 
‘ethnonationalization’, (what we call nation-building efforts), from the modern controversy over 
the name “Kazakhstan”, the salience of the “Kazakhstani” identity, as well as the slowly 
nationalizing character of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.  Diener uses surveys, polls 
and interviews to draw his conclusions.  The Dubuisson-Genina article illuminates the history of 
the Kazakh Oralman policy, as well as efforts to promote Kazakhness within the state by the 
endorsement of religious and cultural sites.  Kudaibergenova continues to articulate motions 
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within Kazakh literary movements in the aforementioned Rewriting the Nation, as well as the 
role of President Nazarbayev as head of the Kazakh nation.  Dr.  Marlene Laruelle is the Director 
of the Central Asian Program at George Washington University. Her cited works observe and 
interrogate modern Kazakhstan, mapping the role of national groups, both political and apolitical 
from 1986 through 2016, and are established through careful study and interviews.  Dr. Peyrouse 
is a current Research Fellow at George Washington University.  In the cited article, he explains 
the role of Nazarbayev’s soft power through the accretion of business roles for the presidential 
family.  While not necessarily critical to the explanation of Kazakh nationalism, the role the 
Nazarbayevs play with regards to the control of state media is very telling towards the current 
role the state plays in nation-building efforts.  Dr.  Tutumlu is an assistant professor of 
International Relations at Gediz University.  His article is a thorough explanation of how the 
government of Kazakhstan establishes control and responds to critical issues, which provides 
important context for a later discussion of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, namely 
how an institution created at first for the obtainment of state legitimacy across all ethnic groups 
is now at the forefront of the ‘Kazakhization’ process. 
Theoretical considerations are supported by work of general theoreticians regarding the 
Nation, such as Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities, and Miroslav Hroch’s “From 
National Movement to Fully-formed Nation”.  As Hroch is a key source of theoretical 
framework for this piece, Alexander Maxwell’s “Typologies and Phases in Nationalism Studies”, 
which strongly reviews Hroch’s theoretical impact on the field of nation studies, is also cited for 
further context. 
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In addition to the work of general theoreticians, we include the work of other regional 
scholars, in particular those who speak to the development of national symbols and national 
histories in Central Asia.  This includes Dr. Gardner Bovingdon’s Autonomy in Xinjiang, which 
details nationalist imperatives in a border province of China, and Viktor Snirelman 
Aleksandrovic’s Who Gets the Past, which details the many ways various Soviet-Nationalizing 
groups reclaimed historical figures for one modern ethnicity or another.   
Aside from these secondary scholarly sources, a wide variety of primary publications in 
English, Kazakh, and Russian are included.  All Kazakh and Russian sources have been 
translated by me.  For the most part, these are articles produced by the government of 
Kazakhstan or by Nazarbayev-owned media companies, such as history.kz, The Astana Times, 
KAZINFORM, government articles such as enbek.gov.kz, akorda.kz, AlmatyTV and the 
Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan.  The representations, therefore are politically biased, yet 
it is this very bias which we wish to discuss.  Useful too, are the biographies of Kunaev, 
Gorbachev and Nazarbayev (both his own autobiography, and the sponsored biography by 
Johnathan Aitken), as each leader tries to reclaim the past for his own ends. Such devices play a 
limited role, being accepted as a flawed and biased account. 
Such biased accounts, to be sure, do not occur in a vacuum, and we would be slightly 
remiss if we did not include counter-points from other national organizations and opposition 
groups.  This includes articles on the role of Jeltoksan as put forward by the Jeltoksan party and 
RadioFreeLiberty. and an article by the opposition newspaper Respublika.  Again, these 
documents’ only role is for the analysis of their bias for academic points, rather than to support a 
factual argument. 
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The Horde of Alash’s Phase A & B, 
 and the Imperial-era Transformative Crisis. 
The appearance of the Horde of Alash, and the resultant Alash Autonomous government 
was a truly novel event.  Unlike previous Kazakh autonomy movements during the 18th and 17th 
centuries, it was the first to organize a Congress and an elected governor, western style 
institutions reflecting the education many of the activists had.  It was the first attempt by an 
organized group of Kazakh activists to better articulate Kazakh nationalism and the Kazakh 
national consciousness for political purposes.  For these reasons, it is considered a strong point 
for the genesis of modern Kazakh nationalism.  Alash’s nationalist effort provided resources for 
later Soviet actors to build upon, as well as foundational ideals which were very inspirational for 
later national movements.  Despite many factors contributing to the Alash Autonomous 
government’s failure, its very existence created a lasting and powerful legacy for others to 
follow.   Extremists seeking to advance a particularly virulent version of Kazakh nationalism 
(wherein the Russians were, at all times in history, heinous ‘invaders’ of a Kazakh motherland) 
invoke Alash as martyrs.  They construct a narrative wherein the Alash government fought 
valiantly to repel the Russians, but were ‘crushed’ by the Soviets, thus devising a national 
equation solved by a very irrational and dangerous conclusion that all Russian influence (be it 
social, economic, or cultural) is ‘alien’ and harmful and therefore needs to be purged to correct 
issues in modern society.   For the state of Kazakhstan, it allows for a legitimacy argument based 
upon the Alash Autonomy’s boundaries.   By these remembrances, be they destabilizing or 
legitimizing, both the Horde Alash and its works continue to hold influence. 
Despite the many novel firsts accomplished by the Horde of Alash, it seems unlikely that 
they achieved Phase C of Hroch’s A-B-C schema.  As Hroch proposes, Phase A, the phase of 
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theoretical elaboration requires that a group of intellectuals devote themselves to scholarly 
enquiry into, and a dissemination of an awareness of linguistic, cultural and social attributes of 
the ‘would-be’ national group.  With its many publications at Orenburg, the Alash movement, 
before it became an autonomous government, seems to meet Hroch’s requirements for Phase A.  
Phase B, the period of ‘patriotic agitation,’ is where a new range of activists emerge, seeking to 
win over as many co-ethnics as possible, specifically to create a future nation.31  Yet, Phase B 
requires vast communicative abilities, both technologically, and socially.  Phase B actors must be 
able to spread their message effectively, and the target demographic must be receptive to the 
actors, that is, the target audience must both be capable (in terms of literacy) and willing (in 
terms of social, class and religious dynamics) to accept the nation-building efforts of the actors.32  
The Alash organizers lacked these capabilities, (and perhaps even the will to make such an effort 
with the general Kazakh public) even as the Alash autonomous government lacked the capacity 
to resist the Red Army.  In other words, despite its strong legacy, the Alash Autonomous 
Government really was as Sir Olaf Caroe writes, “little more than a committee which held 
congresses and issued manifestos.”33  It is hard for the Alash Autonomous Government to be 
considered as a Phase C mass national movement, as it ultimately was neither mass (never truly 
pulling support from Kazakhs across the entire territory or all classes), nor national (Kazakhs 
joining based on a jointly-held notion of Kazakh nationalism) in character, despite the goals, 
claims and achievements of the group.34 
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The Horde of Alash formed in response to what members depicted as a crisis in the 
steppe that they felt threatened the social, cultural and economic lives of all ethnic Kazakhs.  
This was the result, in their estimation, mostly to the evils of Russian Imperial policy.  The 
origins of this crisis lay in the 19th century when the immigration of 2 million migrants from 
western Russia into the Kazakh steppe greatly reduced the amount of traditional pastureland 
available.  This led to strife and rapid loss of livestock.35  The immigrants were encouraged by 
large imperial subsidies, that were often not forthcoming.  The rather rudimentary Russian cities 
and fortress-settlements rarely had enough resources to house or feed them, or to assist them in 
the development of European-style agricultural communities.  Many arriving in Semipalatinsk 
and Akmolinsk had to resort to begging or starve.36  This migration and subsequent suffering 
reinforced the concept among local immigrants and their imperial administrators that the 
Kazakhs, by and large pasture-land nomads native to the region, were using the steppe lands 
inappropriately.  Clashes began occurring regularly between many Kazakh groups, and non-
Kazakhs immigrants who had settled in traditional Kazakh-tribal summer or winter pastures.  
As the power of traditional Kazakh leaders (the Khans), slowly deteriorated in the late 
19th century, the Russian Empire tried harder to resolve the ongoing food and land crisis.  In an 
effort to turn the Kazakh population into sedentary farmers and resolve land disputes between 
immigrant farmers and Kazakh herders, the 1865 Steppe commission assigned land on the 
steppe, giving Kazakh families 4-7 desiatins (a unit of land) each.  This merely alleviated the 
issues of non-Kazakhs while doubling pressure on the traditional herders.  Firstly, it was no easy 
measure for the Kazakhs, who had previously held land in common by tribe, to divide land into 
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parcels held by families.  Secondly, and most importantly, it made the act of herding livestock 
impossible.  For a single sheep needs 5-7 desiatin of pasture to survive annually, and a single 
horse needs 15-24 desiatin.37  Families, should they let land they have never worked continue to 
lie as pasture, could therefore only hope to raise one or two animals.  The intent was to force 
Kazakh nomads into agriculture, but the Steppe commission made no effort to provide the 
knowledge, skills or sufficient equipment for this.  They did not even provide seed, let alone 
adequate arable land to plant it on.  As a result of the starvation and destitution that ensued, a 
great many uprisings and out-migrations followed; most famously the flight of 10,000 Kazakh 
families in 1876 from the Mangyshylak peninsula into eastern Turkestan and beyond.  These 
families decided they would rather face the unknown than let their animals starve or be taken as 
a tax. 
This crisis of economic transition was also a crisis of culture.  The Kazakhs of this period 
were a people who had 40 different nouns for camels across different conditions, whose general 
greeting was to ask about the other’s livestock.  As famous Kazakh author Abai Kunanbayev 
(Абай Құнанбайұлы) wrote, “[for Kazakhs] religion is livestock, people is livestock, knowledge 
is livestock, and influence is livestock”.  Yet, Kazakhs in the era of Alash no longer kept such 
sweeping herds of livestock, and were strongly disincentivized from doing so.38  Thus, although 
this was essentially an economic crisis, for the Kazakhs the crisis was sweeping and general. 
The Alash authors were not conjured from the steppe, but were greatly influenced by an 
already extant Kazakh literary tradition, from 19th century Kazakh authors like Abai 
Kunanbayev, and Ibrahim Altynsaryn.  These men wrote new literary works in Kazakh and 
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translated many Russian and European novels.  Many also wrote down the oral histories and 
epics of their own people.  The pre-Alash authors struggled with themes still prevalent in the age 
of Alash, such as the tension between secularization and Islam and between doctrinal Sunni 
Islam and nomadic steppe traditions, and the incorporation of western advances in cultural, 
technological and educational institutions upon the steppe.39  They wrote what they could in a 
language that saw its first book only in the year 1807, and wrote mostly for a very small 
audience of other teachers and scholars.40  Although both the Horde of Alash and these other 
authors worked to promote the Kazakh language, to form a more cohesive Kazakh ethnic 
identity, and in response of social and economic imperatives on the steppe, Alash was different 
in two ways:  the Kazakh printing press and Kazakh literacy.  
In character, the academics and writers that formed the Horde of Alash were of a new 
generation of Russian-educated, fully literate, Kazakhs.  Many were either wealthy merchants, 
had strong ties to the tsarist administration of the steppe, or were sons of such men.41  Typically 
they were located about Orenburg, Semey and the northern frontier.  They were literate in both 
Kazakh and Russian, as most had been educated in a then-burgeoning network of local schools.  
In 1854, for example, only 8 schools accepted Kazakhs in the entire oblast of Semey, for a total 
of 850-1000 students. By 1894, this had expanded into 134 schools and 29,000 Kazakh students 
in that oblast alone.42  At the time, many saw this movement, led by Alikhan Bokeikhanov as a 
group of “self-styled Kyrgyz”, which is to say, a group of individuals capable of following 
Russian cultural norms due to close contact and/or education with the center of Russia, who 
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chose, in dress and action, to behave as what they considered Kazakhs behaved.  Amanzhalova 
found that those involved in the movement fell into two categories: 1) the aforementioned 
Kazakh intelligentsia, who focused on national revivals of Kazakh literature, and 2) Kazakh 
officials of the pre-revolutionary administration and the children thereof, who wished for a 
greater degree of liberalism, regional autonomy and a greater level of equality with their Russian 
peers.  Kazakh peasants, though lured to the appeal of Kazakh autonomy, were rarely a target 
audience for Alash, even during the failed attempt at an autonomous government.43  
As Benedict Anderson wrote “print languages lay the foundation of the National 
Consciousness.”44  The Kazakh nationalists who officially formed the Horde of Alash published 
prolifically, and often with little censorship in their Kazakh works.  Their abundant publication 
resulted partially from the events of Bloody Sunday and the 1905 Revolution, which weakened 
tsarist power throughout the empire, and a general laxity of censorship as well as Imperial 
coercion of groups previously seen as troublesome, such as Central Asian Muslims.   In 1905, in 
the city of Orenburg alone there were over thirty registered Kazakh language newspapers.45  The 
most popular were Ai Qap (The Monthly Package), and Kazakh, which argued for more Kazakh 
education, more trained Kazakh teachers, and a standardized, codified Kazakh language.46  These 
elites were able to quickly respond to a large variety of Kazakh media, form collaborations and 
organizations, and elaborate ideas in a way that former Kazakh authors could not.  They even 
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produced newspapers solely for this organizational task like Ultshylgha [ұлтшылға] (“for the 
nationalist”).47  
Organizing the diverse society of the Kazakhs into a singular ‘nation’, even theoretically, 
proved to be difficult and in many ways Alash’s solutions were novel.  The critical concept of 
Kazakh nationalism - that all Kazakhs were, or should be, civilly equal was one of the most tense 
and perturbing factors that separated the Alash movement from common Kazakhs with whom, as 
Amanzhalova writes, “the absence of any differentiation between Kazakhs was immediately 
rejected.”48  This problem of the Kazakh nation was also an issue with Kazakh history itself.  It 
was a legendary oral history, with a paucity of contemporary sources.49  The origin of the name 
Kazakh is still a topic of academic discussion to this day.50  This was not as problematic as the 
recent centuries, where the Kazakh people had been divided by horde, by clan, by tribe and by 
family.  No great state had ever held feudal power over the entire steppe, and therefore did not 
provide strict boundaries as a resource upon which the Alash movement could build an ancestral 
national homeland.  Leadership among the Kazakhs was a deeply ceremonial role, meant to be 
used instrumentally rather than constantly.  Although Kasym Khan in 1518, and Khan Tauke in 
1680 had reportedly drawn respect from all Kazakhs, this did not equal a totalitarian or 
monarchical control over all of Kazakhkind, nor indicate a Kazakh ethnic hegemony over the 
would-be Kazakh motherland.51 
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Socially, the Kazakhs were divided by kin and clan.  The three juz [жұз] (horde, lit: 
hundred), or largest clan networks had historically warred with one another, or did not provide 
aid when one came under threat.  They were often disunited.  In 1734, Khan Abulkhair of the 
kishi juz [кіші жұз] (Little Horde) swore vassalage to Russia in order to gain protection from the 
Bashkirs (a group of nomads who were Russian vassals), gifts and tribute from the Russian 
crown, as well as support and prestige against their neighbors, the orta juz [орта жұз] (Middle 
Horde).52 Abulkhair, though a Khan, drew so little respect from the kishi juz, that he frequently 
could not protect Russian emissaries from gangs of his own clan’s aq-saqals [ақсақалдар] 
(Elder, Lit: White-Beards).  In 1748, Ablai Khan of the Orta Juz also swore allegiance to Russia, 
and then proceeded, despite the fact that they were both Russian Vassals, to behead Abulkhair in 
a raid on the Kishi Juz.53  For the entire 18th century, the Uly Juz [Ұлы жүз] (Great or Senior 
Horde) did not have a single Khan.54  This of course is a gross oversimplification of a large 
swath of history: the main point being that Kazakh society did not consider itself as a whole, 
division-less, frictionless or modern nation.  Furthermore, due to a Russian policy wherein 
Russian courts only resolved Russian-Kazakh disputes, and not Kazakh-Kazakh ones, much of 
the violence within Kazakh society until the 1860s had been Kazakh-Kazakh internecine strife.55  
There is also strong evidence that the three Juz, the very basis of Kazakh political identity, had 
only come into existence as recently as 1713.56  Because of this, the history of leaders of the 
Kazakhs gave little aid toward answering the basic questions: “Where did we come from? Who 
are our ancestors?  Who are our historic enemies?” and seemed to stand in the way of a platform 
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of Pan-Kazakh harmony and equality.  Alash, in its nation-building needed to convince all the 
members of the various juz that being Kazakh was an identity superior to, and more meaningful 
than, that of clan and familial ties, whilst writing a history that was neutral to inter-juz politics - a 
great challenge indeed! 
Using history as a basis for Kazakh nationalism caused a further problem as it pertained 
to Russian Imperialism.  In many historical moments, Kazakh leaders had sought Russian 
patronage, including requesting for Russian support against enemy tribes, such as the Dzhungars.  
In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, leaders had welcomed a defensive alliance with the 
Russian Tsars.57  Kazakh khans and other leaders had even asked for the construction of Russian 
forts along certain key rivers and points, such as Semey and Verny.58  Then these same leaders 
did little as Russian troops raided and conquered Turkestan, and did little as these forts became 
the center of growing Russian influence.  With this in mind, what we appear to have is a history 
of co-opted Russian colonialism, which, while banal and harmless during the period between 
1905 and 1917 when the movement was mostly focused on Kazakh liberalism, and nation-
building as a means for greater civil rights, becomes problematic when the goal is to qualify the 
Alash Autonomy and/or to reduce Russian influence on the steppe. 
The basics of any Nationalism claim, “These people together comprise nation X, and they 
are therefore entitled to Y.”  For this claim to be plausible, some traits or characteristics need to 
be held in common, be they ancestors, religions, languages, or other notable distinguishing 
markers.  As the Horde of Alash moved towards creating this common character, Kazakh society 
of the 20th century proved to be an obstacle.  Although many Kazakhs (far fewer than the 
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previous generation) engaged in pastoral nomadism, the economic techniques, imperatives, and 
cultures of high mountain horse and sheep herders varied widely from those of oasis-bound 
desert camel herders.  When we look at the taxonomies of pastoral nomadism written by 
Wolfram Eberhard, we see that all four economic types exist among the Kazakhs, which is to 
say, their economic models, though pastoral nomadism was highly dissimilar.59  To be sure, the 
Kazakhs had developed a culture with its own distinctiveness, but this culture was dispersed 
across a huge territory with few meaningful centers, leading to a host of differing social, cultural, 
linguistic, and religious practices, which varied “aul to aul, clan to clan, and juz to juz.”60  If 
there were specific unifying features to this pre-Alash Kazakh identity, they are difficult to find. 
Thus, when the Alash activists wrote of “being Kazakh” they wrote this distinct from 
nomadism.  In their writings, “being Kazakh” meant much more.61 They conjoined the term 
Tah’elsuzdik Тәуелсіздік [To be masterless, independent] with the idea of Kazakh historical 
nomadism.  This was a novel creation as historical Kazakh society was not so “much 
independence, but a shifting hierarchy” of obedience and respect among familial, clan, tribe and 
horde relationships.62 This largely appealed to what A. K. Bochagovim called the ‘main nutrient 
medium’ of Alash supporters, that is the literate, city and town dwelling Kazakh working class, 
who felt a certain disconnection to their past, and a certain chagrin toward Russian employers, 
courts, and judges.63 For this audience, Alash continued to elaborate a Kazakh identity via the 
publication of popular poems, oral histories, and reprinted works of famous Kazakh authors.    
Indeed, their reproductions of the works of Abai Kunanbayev popularized the recently deceased 
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author as a national hero across the urbanized steppe, causing a Turkestani governor, Nazir 
Törequlov to comment: “A lot has happened in the past ten or fifteen years.  Turkestanis have 
grown a great deal in this period.  Everyone has recognized himself and his companions.  The 
Uzbek has found Amir Navoi [and] the Kazakh has caught hold of Abay!”64 
Politically Alash members formed what we might call today a social-leftist political 
organization, advocating a social state, with healthcare and education: solutions for the broad 
problems of the Kazakh public.65  Before the Autonomous Government, their primary focus was 
upon the codification and standardization of Kazakh, with the elimination of Russian and Persian 
linguistic influences, as well as the usage of the Kazakh language as a primary language within 
local schools - something widely supported by the larger Kazakh populace.66   
The Alash actors not only needed to construct a political and social identity within 
Kazakh nationalism, but also needed to answer historical questions: “Where did we begin?” 
“Who were our historical enemies?”  To do this they needed an interpretation of history 
benefitting the conclusion of a primordial Kazakh identity, with civil equality, whilst upholding 
the virtues and identity constructed in other areas of their movement.  For their construction of 
Kazakh history, the Horde of Alash proceeded in a fashion described by Viktor Aleksandrovič 
Šnirelman:   
“History is a rich field for a search for glorious ancestors and their great deeds.  It is a 
truism that the past is never objectively given; the traditions are always selective.  But it 
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is true that the limits of a historical framework may be crossed in order to invent a 
desired past.”67  
For the ‘desired past’ of the Horde of Alash, the Kazakh nationalists leaned heavily on 
mythologized history.  Their history conjured the image of a primordial Kazakhstan, wherein the 
nation has always existed within similar confines of its geographic area and wherein Russian 
Imperialism was, at the very least, a peculiar feature in an overall atemporal political ethnic 
continuity.68  This promoted an image of the Kazakhs without ethnic division, clans or tribal 
rivalries, no clear beginnings or end, and which incorporated Scythian and pre-Scythian cultures 
as part of their history.69  For the actual ethnogenesis, the authors elaborated upon the mythical 
hero “Alash” as the father of all the Kazakh people.70  They propagated and elaborated terms of 
nationalist theory in Kazakh, such as the aforementioned Kazakh Yeli, Atameken, and Atazhurt.71 
In the works of history that these intellectuals did create, they attempted to conjure a historical 
past to solve their contemporary social and cultural ills.72  In particular, they tried to pivot away 
from overwhelming European supremacy, by focusing on eastern origins, an east which was 
powerful and threatening, writing that the Kazakh people were “the son of the Hun.”73   
These east-born narratives also allowed Alash writers to oppose Pan-Islamic and Pan-
Turkic movements, which the Horde of Alash bemoaned, as Russian imperial officials often did.  
For Alash, these were either non-Kazakh or ‘backward’ where Alash wanted to be progressive.74  
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This could also be seen as a form of competition: Alash wanted to solve the crisis among the 
Kazakhs through Kazakh nationalism, while other groups (for example the Turkestani ulama) 
advocated other popular identities as a basis of socio-economic action.  This tension is perhaps 
best shown at the 1914 All Russian Muslim Congress, where the denunciations by Alikhan 
Bokeikhanov, the man who would lead the Congress of the Alash Autonomy and by other Alash 
leaders against the current ulama had to be interrupted by a stern defense from the Chair.  After 
this fierce argument, Bokeikhanov demanded further administrative divisions between the 
Orenburg Spiritual Assembly, the Steppe Krai, and the rest of Turkestan.75 
On December 13, 1917 The Horde of Alash’s Kazakh Congress, chaired by 
Bokeikhanov, declared the approximate territory of the present-day Republic of Kazakhstan to 
be a new state, the Alash Autonomy.  There were multiple causes, but this was largely owing to 
the conscription of Kazakhs in 1916.76  The new state’s capital was at Semipalatinsk (modern 
day Semey) and called Alash Kala (Alash City).  The initial action was one of neutrality in the 
Russian Civil War, even though the previous regional administrator, Vasile Balabanov was 
fighting with the anti-communist White Army, and had forces throughout the territory.  
Consequently, this stance of neutrality could not last long, and in June 11th 1918, the Alash 
government “agreed to invalidate all decrees issued by Soviet authorities on the territory of the 
Alash Autonomy.”  A. Kenjin, one of the first historians to analyze the Horde of Alash starting 
immediately after their 1920 dissolution by the Red Army, criticized Alash as having “a major 
short-sightedness in the leadership of the Alash Autonomy,” This leadership, in his estimation, 
tried to protect national resources by the means of autonomy and neutrality while surrounded by 
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superior forces fighting in the very lands they declared autonomous.  Kenjin theorized, as 
Amanzhalova reaffirms in her work, that the Horde of Alash’s greatest weakness was that it 
“could not lean” on the nation it intended to rule – outside of Semey, the government had little 
power.77 
A.K. Bochagovim (one of Kenjin’s peers before the era of intense censorship) later 
elaborated on this as the “Apex” failure of Alash.78  Most of Alash were literate elites with strong 
ties to Russia who preferred the Whites over the Reds.  They had spent years elaborating Kazakh 
nationalism to a class of urban, literate Kazakhs.  Despite the vast gains in education over the 
past fifty years, in the period of the Russian Civil War, Kazakhs were a mostly illiterate (93%) 
population.79  This means the broad population of the Kazakhs was disconnected from the Horde 
of Alash, its literature, and its influence.  Thus, as Alash moved from a political group towards a 
weak state government, its core argument for support was that of Kazakh autonomy, yet the shift 
in allegiances and political orientations in regards to the Russian Civil War, combined with the 
general lack of state-building resources, and the hopeless military and security situation, meant 
that the Horde of Alash could not retain the support it had, nor could it ever hope to pose a threat 
to the encroaching Red Army.80   
In 1920 the autonomous government surrendered, and for a time, members of the 
movement and government joined the new Soviet administration.  By 1928 almost all members 
of the Horde of Alash movement, as well as their Kazakh nationalist contemporaries had been 
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purged, and the majority of their literature censored or archived.81  Historical discussion was 
handicapped through the 1920s by attempts to paint Alash as a purely “bourgeois” party against 
efforts by others to show their “national-reactionary” stance.  Both sides distorted the role of 
Alash for various political imperatives.  In 1931, Josef Stalin’s open letter “On the unusual 
question of Soviet History” condemned discussion of Alash as it was a “politically harmful” 
topic of discussion.  Thorough historical interrogation ceased in favor of approved secondary and 
tertiary sources.82  
After Alash, the Soviets, through their nationalities policy and construction of the Kazakh 
SSR began their own nation-building strategy, elaborating their own construction of Kazakhs 
and creating a sovereignty ruled, at least regionally, by Kazakhs.  This was a process that went 
through all three phases of Hroch’s Nation-Building stages, with a Soviet intelligentsia 
coordinating the development and co-optation of Kazakh national support for a national Soviet 
Socialist Republic.  Yet, as this process continued, friction formed between the Muscovite center 
and the Kazakh periphery, and at each of these moments, many Kazakhs were put into crisis, or 
reminded they were subordinate to the Russian center.  In this way, the legacy of the Horde of 
Alash, of which there was little accurate history, grew as a Kazakh state ‘heroically defeated’ by 
the Russian Soviets, as did their novel notion of Тәуелсіздік – that the core of traditional Kazakh 
identity was to be without master.  Kazakhs stirred by Alash’s attempt will grow a national 
consciousness as a “people who were prisoners on their own lands.”83  These parallel processes 
will erupt in the 1986 Jeltoksan riots, Alash will be transfigured into a symbol for various 
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groups, and a new modern conception of the Kazakh nation will be formed – the Phase C of both 
the Horde of Alash and the Soviet nationalities policy. 
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Crises and Kunayev: 
  The Results of Soviet-Kazakh Nation-Building 
 As the previous section sought to define the general crisis leading to the formation of the 
Alash Autonomy and the Horde of Alash, this too seeks to define a transformational crisis of the 
Kazakh nation:  The 1986 Jeltoksan Riots.  Unlike the Horde of Alash, there was no novel nation 
to construct here: the divisions of early 20th century Kazakh society will have been sealed by 
some fifty years of Soviet and Kazakh nation-building efforts.  Indeed, these riots begin with the 
assumption “We are the Kazakh Nation, and therefore We are entitled to X, and the USSR has 
failed to provide such” and the reasoning behind that demand originates in the construction of 
the Kazakh nation within Kazakh nationalism.  With that we will begin by establishing how the 
Kazakh nation was constructed in Soviet ideology, through all three of Hroch’s phases, and how 
through repeated instances of socio-economic strain, the Kazakhs of the KSSR became 
disillusioned with the Soviet center, Soviet history, and began to question all Soviet and Russian 
influence on their ‘national motherland.’   
The Socialist nations of the 1930’s consolidated national identity groups into local and 
federal political entities.84  The USSR had a desire for national self-rule (at least in a limited 
form) from national-republics within itself, as Lenin had determined.  To legitimize these local 
governments, the Soviets set about defining the nationalities as primordial and durable groups 
within history.  This primordialism administratively divided relatively similar ethnicities from 
each other, and also provided local strongholds of soviet-nationalists to resist Pan-Turkic and 
Pan-Islamic movements, a morbid fear the Soviets had inherited from the past administration.85 
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A new cadre of Soviet-Kazakh activists set about recovering Kazakh history, and defining a 
Kazakh homeland in a mode very similar to that of Alash, but with an end goal of creating 
modern Soviet citizens under USSR control rather than a truly sovereign Kazakh state.   
The difficulties of writing a history about the Alash Autonomy in the Soviet period have 
been well described, but this was but one feature of an over-arching issue in Soviet 
Historiography.  With history so politicized, it was extremely difficult for any sort of 
comprehensive Soviet-Kazakh history to be written.  The abortive 1943 edition, the History of 
the Kazakh SSR (Istoria Kazakhskii SSR) by A. Pankratova and M. Abdylkalykhov was hotly 
debated as it incorporated the work of Alash in hopes of “recovering and disseminating a lost 
chapter of national history.”  The authors had hoped this would be permissable as the rest of the 
text promoted a view of pleasant Russian-Kazakh popular friendship through history, barely 
mentioning any historical riots or uprisings.  Yet, the authors were decried as nationalist, and the 
entire document had to be rewritten.86   
For their nation-building efforts, the Soviets had to wrestle with the same divisive 
Kazakh history as the Horde of Alash did.  As the years turned, a successful and popular type of 
Kazakh history was found within the ‘recovery’ of the Kazakh Batyr [батыр](folk hero).  Soviet 
historians found these figures extremely egalitarian and invaluable, as anyone of any class could 
become a batyr through heroic action and noble deeds on the steppe.  In these narratives, the 
batyrs fought against noble-bourgeois aggression as symbolic heroes of a steppe proletariat.  In 
many ways, Soviet-Kazakh history was a mythic compilation of batyrs creating history, rather 
than history as a series of revolts, clashes of civilizations, incidents and revolts against Russian 
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Imperialism.87  Far preferable to the internecine strife and Kazakh-Kazakh battles over livestock 
and land, these narratives showed an “imaginary united steppe,” which translated some historical 
objects, like Kenesary Xan of the Orta Juz and the revolts of the Kishi Juz as Pan-Kazakh 
narratives, rather than heroes or heroic moments of a singular clan.88  In this we can see how a 
certain legacy of historical “recovery” of Kazakh figures begins as far back as Abai and 
continues through Alash, through the Soviet Era and into independence.  
In order to promote Kazakh national consciousness, Soviet elaborators attempted to extol 
empty signifiers of a Kazakh identity – yurts, native dancers, storytellers on a dombra, all with a 
certain Disney-like artificiality.89  It is not that these symbols did not have meaning, but that the 
context of national symbols was meant to be sanitized of any potential non-Soviet or problematic 
meaning.  The Soviets wanted the people of the KSSR to be National in form (so that a modern 
nation could be built with buy in from the local masses) but Soviet in character.  Thus, the 
Soviet-Kazakhs were surely Muslims, but were not meant to practice or to hold a religious 
identity greater than the Soviet one.90  Kazakh cultural eating habits, burials and a strong cultural 
respect for elders occasionally clashed with this effort to produce a modern Soviet identity, and 
as the Soviets did not incorporate these elements into their efforts, they continued to be a 
significant reminder of Kazakh difference, “otherness” and strong sense of a Central Asian self.91 
Early in the Soviet era, propagandists began describing the awful “backwardness” of the 
Kazakh people, from their poverty, to their cultural gender roles and traditions.  This was a top-
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down attempt to reinforce desired Soviet characteristics over the previous Central Asian 
identities.  In a way, this carried on the work of Alash and Abai-era writers: writers who 
struggled with how best to educate and modernize Kazakh society.  Alash and earlier Kazakh 
authors had advocated for Kazakh pedagogy, and articulated modern institutions for other 
Kazakhs, moving in a coercive, prescriptive way.   In contrast, these Soviet “backwardness” 
ideologies in the early Soviet Period often lamented everything about Kazakh personhood and 
culture, painting the entire body as an unnatural and evil lifestyle.  A rescue from this ‘fell’ state 
of being was a key excuse for Soviet colonization and the state-building enterprise across the 
KSSR.92  Cadres of Soviet-Kazakh authors such as Seifullin wrote to “bare the horrors of the 
Kazakh Dark Age,” and Orientalized Kazakh historical figures (particularly Kazakh women) in 
such a fashion that it often appeared that only Sovietization could save the Kazakhs from their 
backwardness.93 
Such depictions were a critical spark for many future Kazakh historians, authors, singers 
and poets in the Soviet era, who wrote not only to elaborate the Kazakh national identity but to 
‘save’ their ancestors from the darkness imposed by early Soviet authors.  The backlash to such 
depictions, and to the constant incarceration of Kazakh historians, slowly fomented a new 
generation of Kazakh nationalists against Soviet censorship.  Here, the Soviets came to fulfill the 
theories of historian Viktor Snirelmen, that ethnogenetic research itself promotes a dangerous 
centrifugal nationalism and is always inherently destabilizing, and that those political institutions 
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which abuse and mythologize history, limit long-term trust within themselves, within history and 
within truth.94   
As we have stated in the previous section, the Soviet era of Kazakhstan was deeply 
instrumental to the development of modern Kazakh nationalism.  This development occurred in 
two ways, by the Soviet development of Kazakh ethnogenesis, Kazakh history and Kazakh 
nationalism, and by reactions both to those nation-building programs and to conditions of living 
in the USSR.  
 The crisis leading to the 1986 Jeltoksan Riots can best be identified by disastrous policies 
seen as clear Russian colonialism within the Kazakh SSR.  Even before the Soviet period, more 
humans and livestock died on the territory of Kazakhstan than in any other area of the Russian 
Civil War.95  Under Stalin, there was the Great Terror, which saw many Kazakh activists, 
scholars and politicians imprisoned or worse.  Collectivization led to an end of traditional 
herding for many Kazakhs, and more than 80% of Kazakh livestock died between the years of 
1917 and 1930.96  Due to collectivization-related famine, the Terror, the Russian Civil War, 
various small incidents, and the events of World War Two, the period between 1917 and 1945 
saw nearly one quarter of the Kazakh population die from violent ends.  Later harmful events 
include the nuclear testing at the Semipalatinsk Polygon site.  Beginning in 1947 the Soviet 
Ministry of defense conducted without evacuation or notification of local Kazakh herders or 
treatment of resulting illnesses, over 470 nuclear bomb tests.  This was near the birthplace of 
Abai and the old seat of the Horde of Alash.97  The nuclear fallout contaminated the soil, air, 
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water, milk, and fruit of an entire oblast, and birth defects continue to plague the descendants of 
the victims.  
In his term, Kruschev led an “indiscriminate purge” of the Kazakh Party apparatus while it 
was led by Brezhnev, which briefly led to the displacement of Kunaev and Kazakh political 
figures throughout the KSSR.98  When Brezhnev became General Secretary of the USSR in 
1964, Kazakhstan came to suffer environmental catastrophes from heavy industrial waste and 
failed attempts to fertilize the Kazakh steppe.99  In 1979, when a group of Germans in 
Tselinograd, asked for their own autonomous territory, riots broke out over the concept of 
territorial division.  Protestors held signs reading “Kazakhstan is 1 land, indivisible.”100  In any 
case, these situations were socially and economically traumatic, and could easily be interpreted 
as a Moscow-based elite moving with a certain degree of carelessness or superiority toward the 
Kazakh people.   
For example, the result of the failed 1953 Virgin Lands Project was the large-scale 
observation that Moscow had no trust in the Kazakh SSR, its leadership, or Kazakh 
agriculturalists.  The Project itself was an attempt, through modern agricultural techniques and 
irrigation, to turn the northern part of Kazakhstan, around the city of Akmolinsk (modern-day 
Astana) into a bread basket of the Soviet Union.  The land chosen however, was poor in 
character, and thus used traditionally as pastureland.  At the same time as the VLP was pushed, 
Moscow planners also demanded a massive increase in the number of livestock, grown both 
around Akmolinsk and the Kazakh SSR as a whole.  The Kazakh SSR Oblast governors were the 
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first to protest, as the introduction of modern “sovkozy” had displaced many Kazakh families 
working at traditional kolkozy.  These leaders were all replaced by Russian Muscovites in 1953, 
as large numbers of Russian settlers came to the project.  Despite the effort put into the region, 
the VLP project was only producing lower yields in both livestock and grain.  The then- Kazakh 
SSR first secretary Shaiakhmetov protested the project, reporting to Moscow that “in 
Kazakhstan, to grow wheat, one cannot grow livestock, and to grow livestock, one cannot grow 
wheat!”  This led to his replacement by Brezhnev in 1954.  As the VLP continued to flounder, 
Moscow created a new administrative unit, the “VLP special zone,” which only had two Kazakhs 
among eleven commissioners.101  All in all a million Slavic settlers migrated to Akmolinsk and 
the VLP special zone, being given special equipment and material previous Kazakh farmers had 
never been able to access, and the memory of this, of Russians being chosen over Kazakhs, and 
of Kazakhs being ‘tossed aside’ on their own territory will remain.102  Perhaps not necessarily a 
wish for independence was formed, but a wish for greater local power and decentralization began 
to be articulated. 
In The Kazakhs, Martha Brill Olcott lists three reasons why the Kazakh nation did not 
‘disappear’ during the various disastrous situations of the 20th century:  (1) Non-Kazakh 
migration to the region was temporary and transient in nature.  (2) A massive increase in Kazakh 
birthrate in comparison to all other ethnic groups began in the late 1950s and continued into the 
post-Soviet era.  (3) The national leadership of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, in his role as First 
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Secretary over the KSSR from December 7th, 1964 until his dismissal on December 16th, 1986 – 
a thirty-two-year career as the most powerful politician in the KSSR.103 
To be sure, Kunayev did not have some magical properties which whisked away all the 
problems on the steppe; in fact, much had nothing to do with the man at all.  A wide series of 
beneficial factors- economic, political, and demographic- occurred during his tenure.  Partial 
credit must be given to Kunayev, however, as his longstanding alliance with Leonid Brezhnev, 
the “most important and durable political alliance” in the USSR at the time, allowed the KSSR to 
operate with greater autonomy than in any past administration.104  Kunayev had shielded 
Brezhnev from internal criticism of the Virgin Lands Project, never once criticizing it, and once 
he was the head of all KSSR agriculture, his administration saw a steadily increased grain and 
livestock harvest year after year – a fact that gave him great legitimacy.  Kunayev used his 
powerful position (as most officials would in the subsequent period of “high Brezhnevism” and 
stagnation) to enrich himself and his family.  He made his brother Obkom secretary, and used the 
executive powers granted to him by the VLP to remove troublesome politicians from oblast and 
raion in the name of “scientific agriculture.”105  That is to say, Kunayev’s reign was no less 
corrupt, no less nepotistic than other contemporary leaders.  He built a system of political 
patronage via cronyism and he used his power over the legal system and his political connections 
to protect that system. 
Yet, this system was also a system of national, Kazakh patronage.  Kunayev preferred 
Kazakhs over Slavs for most political positions.  The KSSR chapter of the Communist Party 
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during Kunayev’s term had a record-breaking average of 10,000 new Kazakh members per year.  
By 1981, 51.9% of the KSSR Central Committee was Kazakh, and 60% of the council of 
ministers was Kazakh (compared to 33% in 1964).  This proportion is remarkable given that the 
1979 census shows Kazakhs making up only 36% of the total population.  As many Russians in 
the KSSR were career-based transients to the region, very few joined the KSSR Communist 
Party.   In addition to political gains, the regime also tripled the budget for the KSSR between 
1960 and 1985, building over 400 libraries, 7600 hectares of parks, 16 colleges, 176 schools and 
a novel Kazakh State University with 11,000 employees.106  Despite this, the economic 
stagnation of the 1970s and 1980s led to more fierce competition among more people over a 
smaller pie, and this reinforced a perception that the KSSR was a zero-sum political and 
economic game among different groups and ethnicities.  For the Kazakhs though, things had 
been better under Kunayev than under any other administrator. 
This ‘semi-autonomy’ of Kunayev also provided a greater degree of freedom for the Kazakh 
press.  This is perhaps best exemplified by the career of Ilyas Yessenberlin, a renowned 
geologist, poet and musician.  While he was the director of the Kazakh State Philharmonic, he 
published a series of Kazakh poems, for which he suffered political repression on the charge of 
not conforming to the standards of “social realist” literature.  Yessenberlin was sent to prison for 
two years, and censored for another eight.  He did not begin publishing again until 1967 during 
the Kunayev administration – well received socialist-realist novels at first.  In 1969 he pivoted to 
historical novels of the Kazakh steppe.  His Koshpendiler [көшпенділер] (“Nomads”) trilogy 
would come to be the number one bestselling works of Kazakh fiction in all KSSR history.107  
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After Kunayev loosened censorship, even authors of considerable nationalist character, such as 
Olzhas Suleimanov found not only an audience, but prestige in the KSSR.  His most 
controversial work Az-i-ya was published in 1975 as a Turkestani retelling of the Russian 
national epic The Tale of Igor’s Campaign from a Central Asian viewpoint which literarily 
confronted the narrative of the Russians as “Big Brothers” among the other nations of the USSR.  
For this Suleimanov was charged with ‘national chauvinism’ in Pravda and KSSR political 
figures, including Kunayev defended both Suleimanov and the text.  It seemed that the more 
criticized the work became, the better it sold in the USSR.  There was no prison nor censure for 
Suleimanov.  In fact by 1983 he would be the head of the Kazakh Writer’s Union, and go on to a 
successful political career.108  This remarkable difference between the careers of Suleimanov and 
Yessenberlin is indicative of the rise of Kazakh national thought in the KSSR under Kunayev.  
We can understand the years of Kunayev’s tenure as the Phase C of the process of Soviet-
Kazakh nation-building.  The Kazakh nation now had disproportionate (in demographic terms) 
control over the economic, social and political powers of the KSSR.  The Soviets had set out to 
build a nation in form and Soviet in character, but instead had created a Soviet republic in form 
with a Kazakh national character.  As stagnation reinforced the perception of a zero-sum game, 
and Kunayev’s administration was clearly beneficial to the Kazakhs, the erosion of Kunayev’s 
patronage networks were seen as a national threat, no matter if a Kazakh agreed with Soviet-
Leninist theory regarding national republics, or a more primordial Kazakh national identity 
which saw Russians as colonizers over the Kazakh motherland.  “Kazakh” was now an identity 
of politically actionable value – the Horde of Alash’s goal was finally met. 
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By 1982 Kunayev was in decline, Brezhnev’s successor Yuri Andropov frequently attacked 
him and his cadres in a show of power. Nursultan Nazarbayev (perhaps positioning himself for 
the future position of 1st Secretary) continued such attacks, and Kunayev’s government was 
assailed in Pravda almost weekly as a show of corrupt governance.   Three Obkom secretaries, 
including Kunayev’s brother were removed from power under Andropov.109  Gorbachev 
continued these ‘attacks’ on Kunayev’s power structure in the name of perestroika.  In his 
memoir, Kunayev expresses shock at his dismissal on December 16th, 1986, as 1986 had been a 
record year for KSSR grain and livestock production, and he wonders what “problem” 
Gorbachev was attempting to fix.110  By this point, only 3 of the 20 heads of the Kazakh SSR 
were now ethnic Kazakhs, showing the extent of both Andropov and Gorbachev’s restructuring 
of the Kazakh national patronage system.111 
Gorbachev, Kunayev and Nazarbayev disagree as to whose idea it was to put Gennady 
Kolbin, a Russian with no ties to the KSSR in charge of the territory. If we presume that 
Gorbachev, Kolbin and Nazarbayev were attempting, as they claim, to eliminate Kunayev’s 
patronage networks and replace his ‘cronies’ with other incorruptible ‘soviet citizens of merit’ 
(namely non-Kazakh SSR bureaucrats) we can see how the center might consider its action a 
positive one, whilst many Kazakhs observed an “ethnic purge” of their political and economic 
centers.112  These observers felt that the only political system beneficial to the Kazakhs the 
KSSR had ever known was now being dismantled by a Russian center for seemingly ill-defined 
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reasons.  The riots following Kunayev’s dismissal preceded similar national riots in Georgia and 
the Baltics – all brought forth by Gorbachev’s emphasis on merit instead of cronyism being 
locally received as a “Russian Invasion” of the other republics.  This spreading center-versus-
periphery national conflict became a centrifugal component in the dissolution of the USSR.113 
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The Second Transformational Crisis:  The 1986 Jeltoksan Riots 
Hroch’s model of a Phase C, which ends with members of the nationality permeating every 
aspect of the state, seems to be a description of Kazakhstan shortly before these Gorbachev-led 
shapeups, as Kazakhs filled most of the government’s staff and the idea of a Kazakh nation was 
unquestioned.  By the time of the Jeltoksan Riots, there had been eight decades of various nation-
building efforts in Kazakhstan.  Kazakhs had an identity and territory that the people valued.  In 
the later days of the Kunayev era, writers like Olzhas Suleimanov began to question aspects of 
Soviet identity and character – namely the role of Russians as an elder brother of the other Soviet 
nationalities.  Over time, this Kazakh-Russian question grew as Kunayev’s power waned.  Yet 
the two traditions were still immutably linked.  What followed the Jeltoqsan Riots, an event 
which sealed in many minds that the Kazakh and Soviet/Russian destinies were separate, was a 
boom of Kazakh national-political groups questioning (rather loudly in the era of glasnost’) 
everything from the KSSR’s future in the USSR, to the veracity of nation-building efforts under 
the Soviet Union, to the future of Kazakh-Slav relationships.  These perturbations permanently 
alter the micro- and macro- political and social environment in Kazakhstan.  Thus, this crisis 
alters the nature of Kazakh nationalism. 
On the morning of December 17th, 1986, the Jeltoqsan protests began small, as the MVD 
reported, with only 250-300 student protestors in Brezhnev square.114  Some of the signs read: 
“The Kazakh Nation deserves a Kazakh Leader,” “Return our Leader to Us” and “Kazakhstan 
belongs to the Kazakhs.”115  As the event continued, it began to lose focus and coherence, and 
some hooligans (whether or not they were the initial protestors) used the disruption to damage or 
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steal property, and in the resulting security force crackdown, there was violence.  Because of 
this, there are many versions of the event.  In Ethnic Battleground, his analysis of the riots, 
Michael Stefany presents detailed accounts from three different sides of the event, from the 
initial MVD security report, to the later Soviet interrogation of the event, to the accounts and 
historical work of the protestors.  The initial MVD report downplayed the scale of the event and 
the number of injuries inflicted by security forces, while underlining in great detail damage done 
during the riots in order to legitimize the ‘minimal force’ used.  The later Shokhanov 
Commission under Nazarbayev presented a differing account that depicted Kolbin an actively 
anti-Kazakh figure, distanced Nazarbayev from control of the situation, and underlined the initial 
protestor’s demands as practical, while abhorring and downplaying the ensuing ‘hooliganism’.  
The protestors themselves provide differing accounts of the event. So too does the government of 
Kazakhstan, and in the thirty-two years since the event, Jeltoqsan’s meaning and statistics have 
continued to be debated to such an extent any new ‘search for truth’ can only be received with a 
prejudicial political bias towards one of the various parties. 
One of the reasons the Jeltoqsan riots have continued to be nationally traumatic is the ethnic 
visualization of the crackdown.  Despite their advances in the political and economic fields of the 
KSSR, very few Kazakhs were members of the security forces.  Kazakhs had never been a large 
part of CPSU Military, at the very highest point 1.2% with 4273 Kazakhs.116  Although there 
were some Kazakhs among the forces sent to Brezhnev Square, this already low number became 
proportionally even less, as Kolbin brought 5000 extra support staff from Moscow to Almaty, 
and even more support from Moscow came as the KGB and other special forces advisors arrived 
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for “Operation Metel”, the supervised response to the protest.  It is unclear exactly how many 
troops were brought into Almaty from abroad, but the MVD only fielded 7,869 local troops with 
some 6457 druzhniki volunteers and reports of the total response vary between 18,118 men and 
23,000. 117  This means that the visual of the riot was of Kazakh protestors versus an 
overwhelming force of armed non-Kazakhs.  These numbers are also useful for another reason – 
they appear to disprove the MVD’s initial report of rather minor estimations of protestors.  If the 
Protestors had truly never bypassed the 2000 or 5000 person maximal mark, as the MVD claims, 
then why did the initial force of nearly 8,000 already supported by Kolbin’s 5000 require the 
enlistment of nearly 7000 additional volunteers including the fire department, and the local 
military school cadets? The scale of the response does not seem like a careful response inasmuch 
as it seems like the MVD brought in every available body and resource they could to resolve the 
situation.  In fact, the troops brought in from abroad remained in Alma-Ata for nearly 18 months 
preparing Operation Typhoon – a successor to Operation Metel should riots form again, which if 
the riots were small and easily dispersed, as the MVD claimed, would have been a seemingly 
pointless endeavor.118  This disparity also lends a slight credence to otherwise unbelievable 
claims, such as that of the exiled Jeltoksan Opposition Party, which claimed between 32,000 to 
60,000 protestors took to the streets of Alma-Ata during the riots.119  Serik Beysembek, minister 
of transportation at the time, reported that at least 50,000 more people used the buses than usual 
on the days of the riots.  If that was buses alone, one wonders at the scale of the riots.120 
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 Aside from the obvious awkwardness of non-Kazakh security forces facing off against 
Kazakh protestors over the removal of Kazakh administrators, the Jeltoqsan Riots became more 
openly nationalist as they continued.  On December 17th, the students demanded a reversal of the 
plenum decision to remove Kunayev, and shouted nationalist slogans, arguing for the right of 
Kazakhs to decide their own national leader on the basis of the Soviet Nationalities policy, for 
Kunayev to be restored, or for him to be replaced by another Kazakh.  They were extremely 
frustrated that “out of 6 million Kazakhs [the center] could not find one to lead the KSSR.”121  
As the protestors in Brezhnev Square grew in number, by some accounts to over 5000 by the end 
of the first day, their complaints grew broader. For example, Amanjol Nalibaev, one of the 
leading protestors loudly complained, “Kazakhstan is rich, but we are poor; [sic] Where did it all 
go?  [Kazakhs] produce meat, milk and bread, but we have nothing to eat…  There is not one 
Soviet Republic with a first Secretary of a Foreign Nationality…  The Center does not consider 
us free to find a leader in our own midst!”122  At 2 pm on this first day, Chairman of the KSSR 
Supreme Soviet Mokashev addressed the crowd, telling them their demands were “groundless” 
and “illegal” but this had no effect.123  
The second day of the protest was a bit wilder, as the protest began losing focus, and became 
more of a general riot.  Gangs of “hooligans” began slashing tires and causing trouble about the 
site of the protest, which by this time had been moved from Brezhnev Square and had been 
separated by the MVD into ‘four manageable areas.’124  People started coming to protest a 
laundry list of complaints, from things such as nuclear testing at the Semipalatinsk site and the 
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failures of the VLP project.  By the end of the day, a food store was broken into, and a small 
number of cars were set on fire.  Nazarbayev and four other secretaries went to speak to the 
protestors, who began chanting his name, as well as the name of Kunayev and other Kazakh or 
Kazakhstani-born politicians as alternatives to Kolbin.  When the speakers insisted that the 
protestors disperse, these speeches to the crowds broke down.  Nazarbayev, as quoted by Aitken, 
claims he was sliced across the face with a rock, while the secretaries in general were pelted with 
snowballs.125  Openly Anti-Russian placards began appearing at the protests.126  At 6:30, seven 
‘leaders’ elected from the protestors were taken for talks with KSSR heads, and after a 
supposedly fruitful conversation came back to the crowds but could not get them to disperse.  
That night was extremely bloody, though it would be unclear which side began the violence:  
122 automobiles and taxis destroyed, two fire trucks flipped, ninety public buses having their 
tires slashed, and 11 buildings burned to the ground as security forces tried to clear the four 
sectors with fire-hoses.  At 11:50 the first death of a member of the security staff was reported, 
and a storm of at least 4,000 protestors retook Brezhnev Square.127  People began reporting that 
Kazakhs were arriving from the country side to support the riots, and as security forces arrested, 
maimed and in a few cases killed protestors, this appeared to draw more support. 
At roughly 7 a.m. on December 19th, it was finally over.  The MVD, KGB and Prokratura 
revealed different numbers of arrested, tallied by the Shokhanov Commission at roughly 6,000, 
of which only 200 were charged.128  There were three mysterious “suicides” of students who 
somehow ‘decided’ to hurl themselves from their dormitory, as well as the hanging of a student 
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awaiting trial.  The student, Rusylbekov somehow strangled himself with an electrical wire that 
could not support his weight.  The MVD reported 733 injuries, although Michael Stefany’s 
review of hospital admissions found that number closer to 1700.129  264 were ejected from 
institutions of higher education, 1164 members of the Almaty Komsomol were reprimanded and 
another 758 expelled.130 
Had he been so inclined, Kolbin, might have been able to heal the wounds between the two 
groups inflicted by this violence, but he decided instead to double down.  He loudly blamed 
Kunaev for organizing the riots (despite little evidence to this claim), for putting too many ethnic 
Kazakhs in charge of the government, as 52% of total party membership at the time was ethnic 
Kazakh (though this was not represented in the higher echelons of the party.)131  Kolbin ejected 
6,643 ethnic Kazakhs from the KSSR Communist Party by the end of 1987, and 5,073 ethnic 
Kazakhs the following year.  In the Kazakh SSR, a popular hatred continued to fester against 
Kolbin and Gorbachev, with large nationalist cadres openly upset at what they called 
“Gorbachev’s 18 month attack” on the Kazakh nation, from what many observed as a dismissal 
of personnel simply on the basis of Kazakh ethnicity.132  Other non-Kazakhs were becoming 
frustrated with Kolbin’s paranoid nature.  He bombastically declared in March of 1987 that 
“antisocial manifestations” were now spreading across the entire KSSR.  Without Kunayev’s 
patronage systems, tension at all levels of governance, and the ejection of so many bureaucrats 
and technocrats, it became extremely difficult to manage the KSSR.133  
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By early 1989, Kolbin had been promoted to a higher office, or as some scholars write, 
“kicked upstairs”, - a time-honored tradition in the USSR and modern China wherein 
troublesome individuals were given ambassadorships or positions of lofty titles but of little 
actual consequence, and the party as a whole saved face.134  Nazarbayev replaced him as a 
winner of a ballot election in the Kazakh Communist Party.   
Nursultan Nazarbayev’s administration attempted to regain legitimacy for the Kazakh SSR 
by incorporating many Kazakh nationalists into the government, (such as the aforementioned 
Mukhtar Shahkhanov, who went on to become a lawmaker and Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, and 
Olzhas Suleimanov who joined the Congress and later become an Ambassador to Rome).135   
The administration allowed Mukhtar Shahkhanov to form an independent Comission to 
investigate the events of Jeltoksan in 1989.  This Comission was headed by a renowned Kazakh 
nationalist.  Under Nazarbayev, the KSSR’s administration’s Prokratura, and all its Komsomol 
groups in all its nineteen KSSR chapters released open letters to Pravda either condemning or 
expressing dissatisfaction with Kolbin’s rule.136  
Outside of politics, Nazarbayev’s administration reinstated Kunayev’s legacy of promoting 
and protecting Kazakh nationalist literature.  This includes the rehabilitation of works by the 
Horde of Alash, and other national works, through glasnost’ and personal support.137  This 
included the text Aldaspan, which reprinted many Kazakh oral histories, stories and poems.  It 
included items banned in the 1970s as well as works by Bokheikhanov and the Horde of Alash.  
In his role as first secretary, Nazarbayev spoke openly of safeguarding the eternal heritage of the 
                                                          
134 Gardner Bovingdon. Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent. 7 
135 Marlene Laruelle,  "Which Future for National-Patriots?  The Landscape of Kazakh Nationalism" 161 
136 Stefany, Ethnic Battlefield, 236 
137 Kudaibergenova, Rewriting the Nation… 176 
 53  
 
Kazakh people.138  This rehabilitation and incorporation of Kazakh nationalists within the 
government continued into independence, where 1992 saw the first reprint of the Kazakh author 
Yessenberlin’s extremely popular Koshpendiler trilogy, a literal ethnogenetic text and creation 
mythos of the Kazakh people in a three part novel.  The new state commissioned Tursynbek 
Kakizhev to write a History of Kazakh Literature, promoting it as an independent field of 
study.139  Nazarbayev praised Yessenberlin and other authors for the glorification of Kazakh 
culture, raising a good many into the role of national heroes.140 
We move from here into the Independence era, with a new government responding to 
national imperatives provoked by Gorbachev and animated through the crackdown of Jeltoksan.  
The riots revealed to many that the Kazakh periphery and USSR center had differing opinions, 
destinies, and a distinct divergence in the political interests of the two groups.  Had the Soviet 
Union continued, it would be interesting to see where this new version of Kazakh nationalism 
led.  Once the frictions and disagreements between the Russians and Kazakhs became public, 
and with agents of the Soviet state cultivating the work of pre-Soviet Kazakh nationalists and 
modern cadres of nationalists, the path of political development would have likely been sharply 
different.  Instead, we came to the period of independence, where the struggle for legitimacy of 
an independent state over a multiethnic territory had vastly differing imperatives, and for the first 
time an independent Kazakh had to must manage its own nation-building processes. 
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The Transitional Crisis of Independence, the “Kazakhstani” Identity, and the Mapping of 
Modern Kazakh Nationalism. 
The modern era of Kazakhstan can be further broken down into three periods, based on 
actions and imperatives the state of Kazakhstan faced.  What we are looking for here is how the 
creation of independent Kazakhstan altered Kazakh nationalism, the Kazakh national 
consciousness, and the role such national forces played within the Kazakh state.  Initially, there 
was a pivot away from glasnost’ era Kazakh national groups and an emboldened effort to begin 
multi-ethnic, multi-national state-making.  Kazakh nationalists were censured, repressed or 
driven from the political field.  Yet, a new type of nationalism, one in which Kazakh nationalism 
served the state, began to be elaborated as Kazakhs once again occupied larger quantities of 
government roles.  Here, we see another cycle of processes where a state attempts to build the 
nations within its borders, and redefines what aspects of the Kazakh character are valuable, what 
forms of Kazakh nationalism are acceptable, and what aspects of national history are valued in 
the new ‘history of Kazakhstan.’  Beginning as a multinational state, we soon see the emergence 
of Kazakhs as the “big brother” nation.  Kazakh language, and cultural characteristics will 
become considered a standing model for others to assimilate to.    
Much of the scholarship on Kazakhstan, whether it is focused on politics, economics, society 
or nationalism describes Nursultan Nazarbayev as a key agent “threading a needle, engaging in a 
balancing act, and intentionally pursuing a course of strategic ambiguity” between countervailing 
forces.141  He is the “key actor” in almost all Kazakhstani policy, and has the power to define, 
shape, and change the discourses of power, including that of state engagement with Kazakh 
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nationalism.142  In many conflicts and arenas, this analysis is visible.  The modern state engages 
in “soft authoritarianism,” wherein many legal powers are not held by the President, and wherein 
many democratic institutions exist on paper, but also where many economic and political 
institutions are owned by the president’s family.143  When President Nazarbayev’s daughter 
Dariga owns eighty percent of the media, and her son owns the majority of other outlets, it is 
difficult for other political organizations to buy advertisements or further their own narratives.144  
When the rest of his family has monopolies on sugar, vodka, copper, uranium, petroleum, and 
the rights to court foreign investment, it strengthens his hold on the country’s economy whilst, 
paradoxically, these industries are not being directly tied to President Nazarbayev on paper.  This 
is his soft power.  When the only political organization is Nur Otan, which has an agenda written 
by the President, and the only opposition is run by a family member, this produces a strange 
system.  For on paper, Nursultan Nazarbayev can be impeached or voted out of office.  On paper, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev is not connected to any business interests, and on paper, Kazakhstan is a 
democracy with a free market.  Yet, in reality, every single institution has been staffed and 
managed in such a way that the President (via proxies) has total coercive control over the 
legislative, judicial, executive, political and economic sectors of Kazakhstan.  President 
Nazarbayev has the power to frame the opposition in any way he wishes.145  Because of his 
enormous and multifaceted influence on life in Kazakhstan, I focus on his actions in greater 
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detail in this chapter as they relate to Kazakh nationalism and current power-politics in 
Kazakhstan. 
Beginning with the Early Independence Period (~1990 to ~1997), Kazakhstan and 
Nazarbayev moved away from open collaboration with Kazakh nationalists, and towards firm 
censorship of National-Patriot opposition groups as fear of a territorial annexation or civil war 
(such as the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Tajikistan Civil War) began to grip the 
government.  This was a time of turmoil, where multi-ethnic civic nationalism (much like the 
1930s Soviet nationalities policy) trumped Kazakh nationalism as the state tries to obtain 
legitimacy and support towards a new stable state from all ethnic groups within its borders.  
Rather than support of local Kazakh national cadres against a central power, Nazarbayev 
suddenly needed broad popular support, and there is a harsh pivot from the glastnost’ era 
approval and co-optation of Kazakh nationalists to their condemnation. 
In the Transitional Period (~1998 to ~2008), Kazakhstan grappled with the demands of a new 
generation; one coming into adulthood within Kazakhstan.  The economic insecurity and 
unknown futures of the past period are now greatly diminished.  This era shows a loosening of 
restrictions on nationalist newspapers, and academic organizations.  Monuments were built to the 
Horde of Alash and Jeltoksan which told different national narratives to support state legitimacy, 
and Nazarbayev ejected many Russian officials from his cabinet, replacing them with young 
Kazakh technocrats.  Here, the Kazakhstani government began a nation-building effort in 
earnest.   
Finally, in the Period of the AKP Pivot (2009 until 2018), the Assembly of the People of 
Kazakhstan, a multi-ethnic democratic body representing all ethnicities of Kazakhstan began a 
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Kazakh national agenda, asking for many of the same reforms elaborated by National-Patriot 
organizations of the 1990s.  This final 2009-2018 period witnesses the development of Kazakh 
national movements across social media platforms, and many Kazakh national reforms by the 
state.  There is a new imperative: Kazakhs are a majority within their country for the first time in 
modern history, at 63 percent of the total population. Now Kazakh national support for the state 
is a more important political resource than multi-ethnic support, and even multi-ethnic 
institutions begin taking on a Kazakh nationalist character.  
Before independence, glasnost’ allowed Kazakh national-political organizations such as 
Zheruyuk (1986), Jeltoksan (1988), Alash (1990) and Azat (1986) to begin operation within the 
SSR.146  These groups advocated for many different things (from a Pan-Turkic multiethnic state, 
to Kazakh as a state language, to democratic or Islamic reforms), and were hardly in agreement 
with one another.  They ranged from careful and civilian Azat, which retired after the fulfillment 
of its goals (an independent Kazakhstan), to the dangerous and virulent Alash (a notably 
different group from the Horde of Alash), whose leader would be exiled after leading a raid 
against the mufti of Kazakhstan in 1994, and then imprisoned after the death of a police officer 
in 2009.147 These groups are the key subjects in the shifting political climate, showing how the 
crises of the early Independence period turned the comparatively liberal KSSR into a strict, 
limiting Kazakhstan.  This is a hard pivot of the Nazarbayev administration from incorporation 
to the abolishment of these entities.  Not one of these Kazakh national-political groups would 
exist beyond the year 1997.  At the dawn of independence Kazakhstan utilized a state-based civic 
nationalism with a clear institutional antagonism toward Kazakh nationalists, shutting national-
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political groups out of the government, and using security forces to imprison or disband lingering 
groups. 
Nazarbayev’s goal in the Early Independence period was the stability and survival of 
Kazakhstan through a major political and economic crisis.  He viewed his main enemies as the 
aforementioned Kazakh national-patriots and Russian nationalists.  These groups could lead to 
sweeping ethnic violence in the former case, and the annexation of northern Kazakhstan to 
Russia in the latter case.  For legitimacy and stability, Nazarbayev’s administration co-opted 
parts of Kazakh nationalism which worked for the state, such as the writings of past Kazakh 
national authors, as well as Kazakh cultural symbols, now present in the flag and the anthem.  
The state co-opted Bata rituals, Kazakh nominal Sufism, poets such as Abai and Muktar 
Auyezov, as well as Batyr and Khan narratives elaborated during the Soviet period.148  As 
Marlene Laruelle wrote, the state engaged in a policy of legitimacy by “Kazakhness” and 
“Kazakhstanness.”  From the Kazakh nationalist movements and Kazakh nationalism, 
“Kazakhness” gave the state a concrete identity and historical genesis.  By the adoption of 
certain nationalist imperatives, such as the promotion of the titular language and policies of 
ethnic repatriation, Kazakhstan became regionally distinct, and gained legitimacy as a Kazakh 
ethnic homeland, both internally and externally.  Elaborations of “Kazakhstanness,” brought on a 
growing civic identity, wherein all ethnic groups could be treated equally under the law, and co-
opted their support whilst allowing them to remain distinct.149  This brought about an odd 
paradox, wherein the Kazakh nationality and others continued to be distinct, yet Kazakhs were 
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primus inter pares, and the state achieved legitimacy from two orthogonally aligned national 
ideologies.  The Soviet Russian Big Brother was traded for a Kazakh one.  It led to a “repression 
of nationalism, yet an agreement that Kazakhstan is a Kazakh homeland.”150   At the same time, 
this homeland narrative could radicalize certain Kazakh groups, who either believed they were 
owed something from the government, or owed a debt from non-Kazakhs, and non-Kazakhs 
never truly became “Kazakhstani”. 151 
When Kazakhstan became independent in December 16, 1991, it did so amid a flurry of 
economic and social problems.  Independence was massively unpopular, with 62 percent of the 
population thinking it was a “great misfortune”.152  During this period, Nazarbayev himself tried 
to strengthen the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to reduce the economic and 
political impact following the break-up of the U.S.S.R..153  He also tried to create a Eurasian 
Union consisting of Kazakhstan and the southern Central Asian Soviet Republics.  Neither a 
Eurasian Union nor a strong CIS came to pass, and to Nazarbayev’s loud and public 
disappointment, Kazakhstan’s independence came within great economic turmoil.154  There was 
rampant hyper-inflation of 2600 percent annually, a forced shift out of a collapsing ruble zone, 
and shifting price controls in Russia which forced market reforms in Kazakhstan.  In addition, 
most of the money owed to Soviet pensioners and retirees had been kept in Moscow, which now 
refused to release the funds, forcing Kazakhstan, in a sense, to pay for access to the money of its 
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citizens.155  Most of these funds were held outside the country by private international firms until 
2013, and a total of 15 percent of the total funds were lost.156  Kazakhstan could not pay wages 
or pensions, could not refine its own underdeveloped oil reserves, and had a sweeping series of 
northern hydroelectric plants which only fed into Russian industry across the border, bringing 
about an energy crisis in an oil rich state.157  Beyond this, there were fuzzy borders between 
Kazakhstan, Russia and China, and the largest protests in Kazakh history at the Semipalatinsk 
nuclear test site, now that the legacy of Soviet testing became public knowledge.  Billions of 
dollars, and thousands of nuclear missiles now needed to be managed by a state which had little 
internal financial or security infrastructure. 
Young Kazakhstan was truly a country where “internal issues were far greater than external 
concerns”.158  Russia, as it seemed at the time, would have a future, and thus, a grand exodus of 
Russians left the steppe for their ‘homeland.’  After the exodus of two million Russians from 
across Kazakhstan, both rural and urban areas were left depopulated, and devoid of engineers, 
doctors, and skilled bureaucrats.  Making matters worse, Russian mayors in northern Kazakhstan 
had been stirred up by Russian nationalists such as Solzhenitsyn and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and 
demanded their oblasts be annexed to Russia as part of the Russian “ancestral hinterland.”159  
This led to widespread Kazakh nationalist counter-protests in Almaty.  The fledgling government 
realized it needed to restrain this national-ethnic furor, before society destabilized, or Russia 
intervened. 
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In addition to gaining Russian-ethnic support, which was at a critical low-point with 88 
percent of Russians expressing distrust in the future of Kazakhstan, the government needed to 
reign in radical Kazakh nationalists as well.160  This was partially because these national 
movements tended to be deeply problematic for the government, calling for radical policies.  For 
example, the Jeltoksan political party had originally formed only to demand release of prisoners 
from the 1986 riots, but then became much more virulent, advocating for Islam to be the center 
of a “new Kazakh society” and declaring a hatred of everything Russian.  It adamantly opposed 
any and all capitalist market reforms, and urged that Cossacks, on the grounds of historical 
abuses, be removed from Kazakhstan.161   Alash (not the 1917 Horde of Alash, but a new group 
using Alash as a symbol), was pan-Islamic, pan-Turkic162 and extremely dangerous, as it 
advocated a new state of “Greater Turkestan” to ‘reclaim’ all Turkic lands of the USSR and 
expel all Slavic peoples.  Azat, an opposition party which had only advocated for independence, 
a civic nationality based on Kazakhstani national-patriotism, and the Kazakh language, was also 
caught within the government response. 
In response to these groups, the government both coerced them, through carefully considered 
appeals to their base, and through rule of law, restricting their ability to function.  In order to 
appeal to the second largest demographic, Nazarbayev stacked many positions in the executive 
branch with Russian administrators.163  He also maneuvered previous Kazakh nationalists out of 
power, mostly by granting them the role of Ambassador.  Azat and Alash were forcibly 
liquidated by the government, and the government stopped licensing national-political groups 
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altogether, which conveniently precluded Russians from forming any such party.  The 
comparatively popular Republican Party of Kazakhstan waited two years, and went on a hunger 
strike, but still was not recognized as a legal political organization.  Their imprisonment in 1994 
sent shockwaves through nationalist and opposition groups, which greatly hindered future 
demonstrations. 164  The repression continued with the 1995 constitution which reduced political 
liberties as well as opposition parties and created the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan 
(AKP).   
The AKP was a brilliant and timely innovation: as a multi-ethnic democratically elected 
organization which represented all the ethnicities of Kazakhstan, it gave re-assurance to non-
Kazakh nationals that they would have a voice in the new government; it fulfilled the need for a 
bi-cameral legislature to placate foreign investors, and it allowed Nazarbayev further space to 
maneuver about the paralyzed Parliament, as the Assembly holds a veto power on all 
Parliamentary legislation, and is in some ways, a superior entity.165  Furthermore, the 1995 
constitution speaks to the people of Kazakhstan, connected by a shared history; it omits all 
reference to ethnic Kazakhs or “special rights.”166 
One of the other repressions of independence was the 1986 Jeltoksan riots.  Before 
independence, the Nazarbayev administration had used Kazakh nationalists and this event to 
claim legitimacy, but in this early period of inter-ethnic turmoil, referring to the incident was 
harmful in many ways.  It supported the radical notion that Russian-Soviet repression of Kazakhs 
was such that Kazakhs needed restitution, adding fuel to the fire stoked by Alash and other 
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radical nationalists.  It was decided examination of the event would do nothing to quell the 
centrifugal forces within Kazakh nationalism.  Further, as the opposition was quick to point out, 
Nazarbayev had been the second most powerful man in the Kazakh SSR at the time of that great 
tragedy, and was one of the few Kazakhs whom Kolbin had not fired.  They thought that both he 
and most of the men in power within newly independent Kazakhstan were the same cadres as 
those during the brutal crackdown of Jeltoksan was inherently dangerous.  During this time, the 
government delayed the report of Shakhanov’s commission by two years, despite being the 
original advocators of the project, and officials went so far to say the event was “mere 
hooliganism” or some to even ask “what tragedy?”167  Open discussion of Jeltoksan faded for a 
time, with a bill to assist victims (and families of victims) of the protest not appearing until 1997, 
where the atmosphere was beginning to change.168 This also shows how the new state had begun 
to interrogate and revise its own national history. 
The Transition period between 1998 and 2008 was a period of not-quite-stability.  Many of 
the difficulties of the post-independence period had been dealt with, or at the very least had long-
term plans to resolve.  National borders were stabilized, the economy and the Kazakh Tenge 
were stabilizing, and Nursultan Nazarbayev began building his informal apparatus of “soft 
authoritarianism” which he is known for today.  The Russian exodus slowed from a dangerous 
flood to a steady trickle, and between the high Kazakh birthrate and Kazakh Oralman 
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repatriation both the total population and Kazakh proportion of the population was and is to this 
day steadily rising.169  With this demographic change, a new generation of Kazakhstan-born 
technocrats came into adulthood.  Many were trained in the US and Europe, and could fulfill 
tasks in a modern financial world.  Due to this, Nazarbayev began filling the ranks of the 
executive branch with young Kazakh professionals, an action sudden and sweeping which left 
the opposition newspaper Respublika to exclaim: “The President has decided to bet on a bunch 
of thirty year olds!,” as it correctly foresaw a complete rotation of Nazarbayev’s personal 
cabinet, all the way up to prime minister.170  This also matched the development of the Nur Otan 
political party, which quickly put a new, young generation of Kazakh politicians below 
Nazarbayev.171 
This new generation of elites were met with a new generation of Kazakh nationalists and 
organizers, as the national movements became aware that engaging with politics led to censure, 
but national groups outside of politics, particularly in the literary field, found excellent support.  
Despite the crushing of Azat and Alash, national dissidence continued unabated in the academic 
world and the literary world.172   Within this more open atmosphere, Azat was reconstituted as a 
non-political organization in 2005, and Kazakh language organizations, from Ana Til Qogami 
[ана тіл қогамі](the mother language society),the Qazaq Til (Kazakh language) association, to 
the Kazakh State Language Movement and many other organizations in a similar vein promoted 
Kazakh as the Republic’s primary language.173 Kazakh nationalist newspapers such as 
Kazakhskaia Pravda, SolDat, and Tribuna began publication, sometimes with articles as virulent 
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as post-independent nationalists, bemoaning the very existence of other ethnicities within the 
Kazakhstan.174  Some new nationalist groups began to form such as Ult Tagdyry [ұлт 
тагдыры](Fate of the Nation), which focused like many other groups on the primacy of the 
Kazakh language, but also encourages non-Kazakhs to “take the opportunity” to leave the 
country.175  Other organizations have this duality, such as Ruhaniyat, which promotes Kazakh 
national literacy and environmentalist, but also a staunchly conservative view of Kazakh culture 
and Islam.  
During these years, the state supported movements in Kazakh literature, as well as in modern 
Kazakh history.  Via the Alash Orda Fund, works about the Horde of Alash founders, as well as 
Kazakh historians, are recovered and rehabilitated.176 One such historical phenomenon thus 
liberated were the 1986 Jeltoksan Riots.  In 2006, “The Dawn of Independence” (Тәуелсіздік 
таңы) monument was unveiled as a memorial to those who died at during the riots.  The context 
of the riots was heavily altered however, as Nazarbayev said at the dedication ceremony: 
“..our young people expressed their protest, as heralds of our independence. State 
authorities tried to exhibit those events as having nationalistic basis. Some people tried to 
call those events a collision between different nations, but it was not so, and history has 
demonstrated that. All what our young people wanted at that time was justice and 
Kazakhstan’s independence.177 
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This new interpretation of the riots is useful as it provides independent Kazakhstan with a firmer 
origin, but also hides the years of repression of those events in the Early Independence Period.  
Further, it alters Jeltoksan in two ways, (1), in that it denies the protestors the content of their 
protest, away from local sovereignty to independence, and (2) in that the nationalistic furor 
carried forth by the riots is denied.  Nazarbayev’s role in the Jeltoksan events has largely been 
altered as well, with modern portrayals within state media which show him as a “hero and leader 
of the protest.”178  This stands in stark disagreement with various retellings of the period, from 
the biographical accounts of Gorbachev, to Kunaev, to two of Nazarbayev’s own biographies as 
well as accounts from various protestors, and should be considered a modern invention of 
history.179 
The year 2009 began with what I find to be one of the most striking and peculiar 
permutations in Kazakhstan’s political history – the Kazakh nationalization of the Assembly of 
the People of Kazakhstan.  The APK attempted to write an elaboration of its principles in a grand 
“Doctrine of National Unity.”  This was to be a great culmination of Kazakhstanness and the 
Kazakhstani identity.  In response, many of the new ‘apolitical’ nationalist movements went on a 
hunger strike.  Unlike the 1992 hunger strike with Alash and Azat, this one actually worked, and 
the Doctrine was majorly rewritten.  The word “Kazakhstani” was cut entirely from the final 
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draft: the caveat ensuring the future of the Russian language within Kazakhstan was removed, 
and Kazakhs were called a “core consolidating center” of the country.180  The APK rests on 
democratic legal principles, such that it is possible the Kazakh demographic now has greater 
political implications, or it is possible that the loosening of restrictions on Kazakh national 
groups, along with the introduction of uncontrollable media space, such as Facebook has created 
a stronger cadre of Kazakh nationalists.  In any case, from this period forward, the APK has 
repeatedly pushed for goals originally enumerated by the Horde of Alash, by the glasnost’ 
National-Patriots, and by Kazakh opposition groups at the time of independence and their  
“apolitical” offspring – that of the primacy of the Kazakh language, and the noted primacy of 
Kazakhs within Kazakhstan.181 
Through the vehicle of the APK, the state has wrestled with issues deeply nationalistic in 
character.  This includes a shift away from Cyrillic toward a Latin script for the Kazakh 
language, an idea first put forward in the modern era by the virulent, Pan-Turkic Alash of the 
1990s.182  The concept of a change in the name of the country was hotly debated, both by the 
broader public and by nationalist groups.  Diener hypothesizes it is possible that Kazakhstan did 
not accept the name Kazakh Yeli because there was strong support for an alternative: “the 
Kazakh Republic.”183  This is a far more national name.  In 2011, the APK stated that it would no 
longer focus on the “recovery of history” and focus instead on the development of the 
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“Kazakhstani identity.”184  On April 24, 2013, Nazarbayev elaborated this “Kazakhstani 
Identity:” 
“The Kazakh land has united more than 100 ethnic groups. Of course, good cement is 
needed to turn all this multi-ethnic diversity into a united nation. Today, the main factor 
cementing the nation is the Kazakh language, the state language.”185 
That is, the key component of a Kazakhstani identity is the ability to speak fluently in the 
Kazakh language.  In 2015, Nazarbayev addressed the 22nd session of the AKP.  During the 
session, Nazarbayev proposed a national day of gratitude among ethnic groups toward the 
Kazakh people, and to mark it on March 1st, the anniversary of the founding of the AKP.  If this 
trend continues, non-Kazakhs truly will be second class citizens within the state. 
Social media has become a critical tool for Kazakh national groups, as it allows 
marketplaces of information outside of soft authoritarian control.  In these spaces large audiences 
are able to engage in Kazakh nationalist discourse.186  The phrases of the Horde of Alash are 
elaborated, and other phrases are used, such as Nagyz Kazakh (Real Kazakh) and Shala Kazakh 
(Half Effort Kazakh) to differentiate between rural Kazakhophile and urban Russian-speaking or 
‘Russophile’ Kazakhs.187  New groups, media outlets, and youth organizations continue to 
propagate in greater numbers as the government pivots more toward Kazakh ethnic hegemony. 
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This leaves Kazakhstan with a government that has become both national in form and 
national in character, one which allows for debate about the Kazakh national consciousness and 
which attempts, via the AKP to instill Kazakh characteristics in the non-Kazakh minorities of the 
state.  One wonders where exactly this national shift will end.  Will Kazakh nationalism lead to 
an expulsion of other groups?  When Nazarbayev dies, will attempts at multi-ethnic restructuring 
lead to a second set of Jeltoksan riots?  If Kazakh nationalism and the Kazakh identity are so 
politically potent, how will Kazakhstan interpret the burgeoning crackdown on ethnic Kazakhs in 
neighboring China?  In any case, Kazakh nationalism has shown itself to be a resilient and 
powerful force within the region, one still used to co-opt legitimacy and build the state. 
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Conclusion 
Miroslav Hroch writes that a true nationalist is “one who gives absolute priority to the 
values of the nation over all other values and interests.”188  This document has analyzed the 
development of Kazakh nationalism via the A-B-C schema of Miroslav Hroch, and has described 
key transformational crises which have altered Kazakh nationalism.  We now see, by recent 
developments in the AKP and the work of national scholars who have mapped the modern 
Kazakh national landscape, a nationalism which supports the Kazakh state, and a Kazakhstani 
state which is actively engaging in nation-building.  From once struggling to find a common 
national character in order to struggle effectively against a higher power, Kazakhs, a well-
defined nation are now primus inter pares in their own sovereign nation-state.   
One wonders to the extent this nation-state relationship will govern the future.  Will 
Kazakhstan become akin to Latvia – an ethnic hegemony?  Will non-Kazakhs continue to be 
treated fairly in the new order?  Will this critical relationship lead Kazakhstan into conflict with 
its neighbors (particularly China) over issues affecting Kazakh populations in their borders?  
Kunayev showed how powerful Kazakh nationalism could be as a state-making political 
apparatus.  1986 showed just how powerful Kazakh nationalism could be as a centrifugal force 
and a foundation of protest.  Even should this not fall to extremes, the history of Kazakh 
nationalism as a force is a potent one, and one which should not be ignored in the coming 
decades. 
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